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GENERAL ABSTRACT 
In this thesis contingent claims techniques have been applied to various 
specifications of the economic problem of optimizing the expected value of a 
welfare function. In paper I we consider the relationship between financial 
market completeness, corn production, and the com target price program. Using 
the observation that the program is similar to a government issued put option, we 
found that the per acre program benefit, at around $20/acre was quite large, that 
the program encourages producers to trade options, and that the existence of 
contingent markets facilitates the policy maker in decoupling agricultural support. 
In paper II we proposed a method for estimating the expected cost to the 
government of the corn target price program. The model allows the government 
to understand the implications for output and budget control of different program 
parameter choices. This model may be adapted to other economic problems, 
such as the effects of wage or rent control laws on production and factor use. In 
paper HI we suggest that there is an inconsistency between the structure of 
existing contingent claims markets and how economists would seem to prefer to 
approximate demand functions. We propose an alternative structure that is 
consistent with the preferred approach to demand function approximation, and 
with the moment based foundations of statistics. In the final paper we propose 
an alternative perspective on problems involving the maximization of the 
expected value of a welfare function. We reformulate the objective function in 
vii 
terms of options. We then show that existing techniques from economics, 
statistics, and finance theory may be applied to better understand the economic 
effects of uncertainty. Three standard economic problems are considered; 
valuation of a risky investment, production under price uncertainty, and the 
effects of price uncertainty on expected profit. 
1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Explanation of Dissertation Format 
The papers in this thesis, though similar in subject matter, are entirely self-
contained. They each have their own introduction, literature review, conclusions, 
and references. The papers are linked both through the issues addressed, and 
through the techniques used. Each paper seeks to understand the effect of 
nonlinearities on economic decisions and welfare when price is uncertain. All 
papers apply the financial theory of option pricing to models of economic 
phenomena. Following the papers is a general summary. 
Participant Value and Production Effects of Target Price Programs: A 
Contingent Claims Approach 
It has been noted that the U.S. target price program can be considered as 
contingent claims issued by the U.S. government to participating farmers. This 
paper extends the analogy by modeling the acreage requirement as the cost of 
participation. The results have implications for extension advice regarding 
participation decisions. It is also shown that the value of the program to 
producers depends on the existence and accessibility of contingent claims 
markets, and that the deficiency payments scheme makes it optimal to participate 
in options markets. Inferences are also made concerning the production effects 
of alternate forms of income support. 
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Government Costs of Target Price Supports 
The U S commodity target price program can be considered as the issuance 
by the U.S. government of contingent claims to participating farmers. This paper 
models the acreage set-aside requirement as the premium paid for these 
contingent claims. A rational expectations model of the interrelationships 
between program parameters, production, futures price, program cost, and 
producer benefit is developed. The model can accommodate stochasticity on 
either supply and\or demand. We use the model to estimate the expected 
government cost of the corn target price program in 1993. The principal 
innovation in this paper is the accommodation of choice variables in the 
stochastic model. The approach has applications in many other areas of 
economics. 
Polynomial Price Contracts 
This paper compares the approach to functional approximation used in 
mathematics, statistics, and econometrics with that used in creating contingent 
financial markets. Evidence is presented that suggests options markets are not 
optimal. An alternative market structure is proposed that would increase hedging 
effectiveness, and the risk return tradeoff for hedgers and speculators, 
respectively. Fewer derivative markets would be required per underlying asset 
than with options markets. The settlement price of these alternative markets 
would be some power of the closing futures price. The purpose of this paper is 
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to advocate that further research is warranted concerning the optimal structure of 
contingent markets when markets are costly to maintain. 
An Alternative Perspective on the Expected Value of a Function: 
Economic Applications 
By approximating the expected value of a function, nonlinear in a stochastic 
variable, as the sum of values of a sequence of options, we gain additional 
insights about economic behavior under uncertainty. This is because the 
respecified behavioral equations contain probabilities and conditional 
expectations that respond in a predictable manner to changes in the probability 
distribution. The procedure is formally developed in the context of expected 
utility maximization when output price is stochastic. It is applied to three 
problems: to value a rislqr investment, to study production under price 
uncertainty, and to study the effect of price uncertainty on expected output when 
output can be modified in response to realized price. 
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PAPER I 
PARTICIPANT VALUE AND PRODUCTION EFFECTS OF TARGET 
PRICE PROGRAMS: A CONTINGENT CLAIMS APPROACH 
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PARTICIPANT VALUE AND PRODUCTION EFFECTS OF TARGET 
PRICE PROGRAMS: A CONTINGENT CLAIMS APPROACH 
by 
David Hennessy and Dermot J. Hayes 
Department of Economics 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1993 
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ABSTRACT 
It has been noted that the U.S. target price program can be considered as 
contingent claims issued by the U.S. government to participating farmers. This 
paper extends the analogy by modeling the acreage requirement as the cost of 
participation. The results have implications for extension advice regarding 
participation decisions. It is also shown that the value of the program to 
producers depends on the existence and accessibility of contingent claims 
markets, and that the deficiency payments scheme makes it optimal to participate 
in options markets. 
7 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The 1990 Farm Bill introduced some important changes into U.S. grain 
policies. For the first time, producers received deficiency payments based on 
historical (not actual) yields and acreages; also, they were given the opportunity 
to plant 15 percent of their program acreage to nonprogram crops. The effect of 
these changes was to ensure that acreage and input decisions were made in 
response to expected market conditions. The removal of the link between actual 
production and government payments also imbued the program with option-like 
characteristics. As is true for owners of put options, program participants receive 
the difference (if positive) between a fixed target (or strike) price, and the 
market price, for a specified volume of production that is independent of actual 
production. This option-like quality has several interrelated implications, each of 
which we examine here. 
By modeling the acreage reduction requirement as an option premium, one 
can develop participation criteria that do not depend on personal preferences. 
Because the participation decision is independent of the risk preferences of 
producers, we can develop objective measures of the benefits to producers of 
program participation under different program parameters, market conditions, 
and land-quality distributions. The procedure used to examine the participation 
decision differs from that currently used by extension agents and should, 
therefore, be of direct use to producers. 
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Because producers can choose to "sell" their government-provided put option 
on commodity options markets, the program does not have output-enhancing or 
risk-reducing effects. This raises the question as to the value of deficiency 
payments schemes when options and futures markets are absent (for example, 
agricultural commodities in the EC). The third section of the paper compares 
the certainty equivalent returns for typical midwestern grain producers under 
different institutional environments. These values indicate that, for producers 
enrolled in the program, there are benefits from having access to both futures 
and options markets. This result contrasts with that obtained by Lapan et al. 
(1991) who show that in the absence of government programs, producers have no 
incentive to participate in options markets. The CER values also show that the 
benefits of the program, when no futures or options market exists, can be quite 
large. This is true because a free put option is more valuable if put options 
cannot be purchased. This latter result means that "decoupled" deficiency 
payment schemes would have output expansionary effects if they are introduced 
into market envirormients where no commodity markets exist. One implication 
of this argument is that should the EC introduce a farm program that is similar 
in every respect to that currently used in the United States, the program would 
not be decoupled. 
The last section of the paper presents two theorems about the output 
expansionary effect of these programs in the presence and absence of contingent 
claims markets. 
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2. PREVIOUS WORK 
Gardner (1977) originally pointed out the close similarity between the 
deficiency payments schemes and the yet-to-be developed commodity options 
contracts. Gardner (1977) and Kahl (1986) suggested the deficiency payments 
scheme be replaced with free options. This idea proved impractical until 
payments were decoupled from actual production in the 1990 Farm Bill. In 1993, 
the government launched a pilot options program in nine midwestern counties. 
This program allows producers to choose between program participation or free 
put options. 
Turvey et al. (1988) showed how producers could use options markets to 
make the program participation decision. Their approach did not, however, allow 
for either market incompleteness or heterogeneity of land quality, important 
determinants of the cost of participation. Love and Foster (1990) and Brooks et 
al. (1992) model the effects of heterogeneous land quality on the participation 
decision, but do not follow through to decide when a given producer should 
participate. Innes and Hausser (1989) show how important the assumption of 
complete markets is in determining the relative effectiveness of different 
agricultural policies. It is shown that with incomplete markets government price 
guarantees, even with a set-aside requirement, can improve the welfare of 
farmers and consumers while also generating enough tax revenue to fund the 
program. In two subsequent (1990 a, 1990 b) papers Innes identified the 
conditions under which a target price policy increases welfare in an incomplete 
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market enviromnent. 
There has been considerable analysis conducted on the implications for 
supply of changing government program parameters. These include Floyd (1965), 
Lidman and Bawden (1974), Evans (1980), Lee and Helmberger (1985), Miranda 
and Helmberger (1988), and Perry et al. (1989). Of these studies only one, Lee 
and Helmberger, attempted to model supply response under a free market 
regime. This is because supply control of one form or another has been in effect 
in the United States for most major crops for all but a handful of years since 
WW n. Gardner (1987) considers some of the political determinants of the 
magnitude and nature of agricultural support. Chavas et al. (1983) investigates 
the acreage response to program parameters and futures prices. Marcus and 
Modest (1986) investigate the cost to the government of the price floor. 
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no rigorous attempt to link the 
program participation decision to the benefits (option value) and costs (option 
premium or set-aside requirement). This is surprising because as has become 
obvious since the implementation of the pilot options program, and as we will 
show in the next section, the participation decision is simply one of determining 
whether the program parameters are those of a fairly priced option. 
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3. THE CONTINGENT CLAIMS MODEL 
Under the provisions of the 1990 Farm Act a producer eligible for deficiency 
payments has contracted to idle a certain fraction, a, of base acres (eligible 
acres), B, in return for a price floor guarantee, Pq, on a pre-specified eligible per 
acre output, yo, for each of (1 - 0.15 - o)B acres. The 15 percent of base acres on 
which no deficiency payment can be made may be planted under any crop except 
fruits and vegetables. Assume the accessibility of put markets and denote the 
present value of a put option with strike price Pq as W(Pg). Because the 
producer can sell puts with strike price Pq to restore the position that would have 
pertained were there no program, the program benefits are 
(0.85 -  a )  By ,  W(P^ )  (1) 
in cash equivalents. Assume (as Black (1976) does) that there is no basis risk, 
that prices are lognormally distributed, that the short-term interest rate, r, is 
constant, that there are no transaction costs, borrowing constraints, or restrictions 
on short sales. Then the benefit to the producer of the program is 
(0.S5 - a) By„e -'MPg N(  -dj) - F, iV( -d,)]. (2) 
where T is time index value at harvest 
t is time index value at sign up for the program 
d, = [ln(F,/Po) + 0.5 o' (T - t)]/o (T -1) 
4 = [ln(F,/P<3) - 0.5 (T - t)]/o (T -1) 
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a is the implied volatility or the annualized standard deviation of the 
instantaneous rate of return. 
F, is futures price at time t (see Rubinstein 1976 or Myers and Hanson 
1993). 
The cost is the present value of foregone profits from set-aside land. The 
idled land will be the 100a percent of lowest quality land. Define PV(.) as the 
present value operator, n(v) as the per acre profit from land of quality v, (v is 
indexed such that 0 ^ v ^ 1), J(v) as the cumulative density function of a 
producer's land quality, and j'(v) as the probability density function of v. Then 
the cost is 
b) PV[n{v)]j{v)dv. (3) 
0 
Thus the participation decision depends on the sign of 
H = (0.85 - «) - F,N{-d,)] 
a (4) 
- B f PV[n(v)]j(v)dv. 
0 
Note that 
dH/da < 0, dH/dP^ > 0. 
We also note that 
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dH/ÔF, = - (0.85 - a) By^e N( -d^) 
-b1 {dPV[n(v)]/dF) j(v) dv < 0. 
0 
As futures price rises, participation falls for two reasons: the value of the 
guarantee falls and the cost of set-aside rises. 
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4. THE PARTICIPATION DECISION 
In this section, we will consider the participation decision of a representative 
Midwestern corn producer in 1993. There are seven principal variables, the 
value of which may influence the decision. These are: the set-aside rate, the 
target price, the sowing date futures price, a measure of land quality spread, a 
measure of mean land quality, implied volatility, and interest rates. Implied 
volatility is measured as 0.224 from the April 16, 1993 price of the September 
1993 call with strike price $2.40. The interest rate is assumed to be the April 
1993 prime rate of 6 percent. Three set-aside rates are considered: a = 0.05, 
0.1, 0.15. Three target prices are considered: Pq = $2.60/bu, $2.75/bu, 
$2.90/bu. The price $2.75/bu is the target price set in law by the 1990 Farm Bill 
for the period 1991 through 1995. The futures price, F„ for settlement in 
December 1993 is assumed to be $2.415/bu, the 4/16/'93 price. 
In modeling land quality, we assume that per-acre rental rate fairly 
represents quality. We consider a farm with average quality land of $100/acre 
and another with average quality land of $120/acre. We assume profit is 
uniformly distributed and consider land-quality distributions on each farm type. 
The first quality distribution assumes all land is of the same quality; the second 
assumes the rental value is uniformly distributed from plus $30 to minus $30 of 
the mean quality. Thus the four distributions are: 
1) U[ $100, $100] 2) U[ $70, $130] 
3) U[ $120, $120] 4) U[ $90, $150]. 
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All distributions are considered in Table 1. We can see that for the program 
parameters used in Table 1, the per-acre value of the program is almost always 
positive/ 
The values in Table 1 rise with Pq, and with the futures price, and fall with 
the set-aside rate. They rise, but only marginally, with a rise in the spread of 
land quality. If one assumes that base yield rises with average land quality, then 
the program would appear to be approximately land quality neutral. For the 
conditions existing in the spring of 1993 ($2.75 target price, and 10 percent set 
aside), the program is worth approximately $20/acre to producers. 
The approach used to derive the values in Table 1 is of direct use to 
producers and to extension agents. In years when the government program is less 
generous, producers could use this approach when deciding on program 
participation. Also, a slight modification of the procedure would allow the 
producer to solve for a critical land rental value. If participation requirements 
required producers to set aside land with a rental value greater than this critical 
value, then program participation would not be optimal. A final use for the 
values presented in Table 1 would be for calculating the expected returns on corn 
production. This would equal the futures price times the expected yield plus the 
program yield times the values presented in Table 1. 
^Possible explanations for the real world nonparticipation are cross-compliance 
constraints, environmental restrictions, farm payment limitations, and philosophical dislike 
of government programs. 
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Table 1: The Participation Decision: Per acre Value of the Target Price Program. 
Program Parameters 
a Pq a) Averagg land quality $100 b) Average land quality $120 
and base vield 115 bu/acre^ and base yield 135 bu/acre 
Distribution 
$100-$100 $70-$120 $120-$120 $90-$ 150 
$2.60 $18.2 $19.6 $21.2 $22.6 
0.05 $2.75 $28.7 $30.1 $33.5 $34.9 
$2.90 $40.4 $41.8 $47.3 $48.7 
$2.60 $11.9 $14.5 $13.7 $16.3 
0.10 $2.75 $21.7 $24.3 $25.2 $27.8 
$2.90 $32.7 $35.3 $38.1 $40.7 
$2.60 $5.6 $9.3 $6.2 $9.9 
0.15 $2.75 $14.7 $18.5 $16.9 $20.6 
$2.90 $25.0 $28.7 $28.9 $32.7 
$2.60 $-0.7 $3.9 $-1.4 $3.3 
0.20 $2.75 $7.8 $12.4 $8.6 $13.3 
$2.90 $17.3 $22.0 $19.8 $24.5 
^To calculate the per bushel value, divide the per acre values by 115 and 135. To 
incorporate basis, simply adjust the futures price by the expected difference 
between local cash prices and the maturity futures price. 
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5. THE EFFECT OF MARKET COMPLETION 
To evaluate the effects of market completion on welfare and output, we 
consider a typical Iowa crop producer. The farm is 400 acres all under crops. 
Com is grown on 60 percent of the land and soybeans on the remaining 40 
percent. Budget data is extracted from "Estimated Costs of Crop Production in 
Iowa, 1993" (Iowa State University 1992). Expected corn yield is 135 bu/acre 
while expected soybean yield is 45 bu/acre. Per-acre total costs for corn is 
$297.84, while for soybeans it is $233.76. Spring futures prices for December 
corn and November soybeans are $2,415 and $5,975, respectively. It is assumed 
that program yield per acre is the expected 1993 yield per acre. The set-aside 
rate and target price are set equal to the actual 1993 values of 10 percent and 
$2.75/bu, respectively. Annual implied volatility is assumed to be 0.2240 for corn 
and 0.1575 for soybeans as imputed from Black's formula and April 1993 option 
prices for September at the money contracts. We have no way of imputing the 
1993 log correlation between corn and soybean prices, but we assume that it is 
positive, and use three values of 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. We choose a CARA utility 
function and consider two reasonable risk aversion levels representing low, and 
high-risk aversion (see Babcock et al. for a description on how to choose risk 
aversion coefficients). Finally, we consider four levels of market completion; no 
futures or options markets (column 3), futures markets in both corn and soybeans 
(column 4), one put market with strike price $2.75 (column 6), and futures 
together with a put market with strike price $2.75 (column 5). We also consider 
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a nonrandom subsidy which generates the same expected cost for the 
government. We consider the impact of this nonrandom subsidy when these are 
no markets (column 7) and when there are both futures and options markets 
(column 8). This nonrandom subsidy increases producer returns by the same 
amount, but does not have the risk-reducing effects of the put option. 
Table 2 presents the certainty equivalent returns for each situation.^ These 
figures are slightly exaggerated because risk-averse producers will control risk by 
reducing output. It can be seen that market completion is worth about $2,700 to 
producers with high-risk aversion. As the correlation between corn and soybean 
prices rise, the markets become more useful (increased certainty equivalent 
returns) because the producer's revenue becomes more variable. The availability 
of the options market at the target price when no futures markets exist (column 
6) does not increase the producer's welfare as much as the availability of futures 
markets only (column 4). This is because the option position the government 
donates to the producer is approximately correct, i.e., it is the one he or she 
would have purchased on the commodity options market. 
Comparing the nonrandom subsidy with the target price program when no 
financial markets exist (columns 7 and 3), we see that while low risk averters are 
not substantially affected, high-risk averters would prefer by far the target price 
program. When futures and options markets exist, producers are indifferent 
^e procedure we use to calculate the CER values is presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 2. Effect of market completion on certainty equivalent return to a typical 
Midwestern grain producer enrolled in the 1993 farm program 
fl) 
Risk 
Aversion 
Level 
k 
(2) 
No 
Futures 
or 
Options 
(3) 
Futures 
Only 
(4) 
Futures 
and 
Options 
(5) 
Options 
Only 
(6) 
Non-random 
Subsidy (same ex-
ante cost to 
government) 
No 
Futures Futures 
or and 
Options Options 
V7^ 78^ 
0.1 
0.00001 $64,053 $64,188 $64,227 $64,071 $63,418 $64,227 
0.0002 $61,727 $63,739 $64,227 $61,854 $51,830 $64,227 
0.5 
0.00001 
0.0002 
$64,014 
$61,502 
$64,188 
$63,729 
$64,227 
$64,227 
$64,078 
$62,138 
$63,225 
$49,198 
$64,227 
$64,227 
0.9 
0.00001 
0.0002 
$63,974 
$61,368 
$64,188 
$63,729 
$64,227 
$64,227 
$64,111 
$62,975 
$63,031 
$46,791 
$64,227 
$64,227 
between the policies (columns 5 and 8). 
These results indicate that in the EC, where options markets by and large do 
not exist, a target price program would be preferred to nonrandom direct 
payments. This result is consistent with limes (1990 a, 1990 b). Curiously, in 
changing their crop support programs, the EC appears to have opted for a 
nonrandom subsidy (see any description of the CAP reform proposals). This may 
be because of a belief that farm prices will not vaiy much in the future, or it may 
be to make farm support more open and so easier to control. 
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6. THE PROGRAM AND MARKET COMPLETION 
In this section, we shall present two theorems that formalize the statements 
made earlier about market completeness. These theorems are relevant because 
EC policy makers have argued that U.S. deficiency payments schemes are not 
production neutral and also because the ongoing reforms of the CAP are moving 
the EC toward U.S.-type deficiency payments schemes (FAPRI 1992). 
A Separation Theorem:^ Consider a risk averse expected utility maximizing 
firm with CARA preferences facing a linear profit function and an uncertain price. 
Let there be no contingent markets except a put market with strike price Pq. Then 
output is invariant to the farm's endowment of program output, while endowments 
are substituted one for one with put purchases in the options market. 
Proof: Express the expected utility function as 
EU[Py -  Ciy) + -  P)LX, + -  P)L -  P^)Z] 
where L = 0 if Pf. < P (6) 
L = 1 otherwise. 
Here y denotes output, C(y)is the cost function, is the farm's endowment of 
program output, Z is farm purchases of put options, and is the price of a put 
option. The producer chooses y and Z. The first order conditions are 
^We call this a separation theorem because the farm program is completely decoupled 
under CARA. 
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E[U'[A] [f -  C'(y)\)  = 0, (7) 
and 
E9]'lA]{(Pa-P)L-PJi)  '0 ,  (8) 
where A = Py - C(y) + (Pq - P) L X,, + ((Pq - P) L - Pz) Z. Completely 
differentiating the first order conditions with respect to y, Z, and Xq we find 
SZ ^ , jq> 
- 4% 
where Eg y is the cross partial derivative with respect to a and b. In each case by 
substituting in the CARA condition and using the first order conditions we find 
that Ez,z = ^z,*o and ^y.z ^y,*o. and so equation (9) reduces to 0 and 
equation (10) reduces to - IM 
This theorem shows that the current U.S. deficiency payments scheme is 
decoupled in the absence of nearly all contingent markets so long as producers 
exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. 
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A Nonseparation Theorem: Consider a risk averse expected utility maximizing 
firm facing an uncertain output price. Let there be no contingent markets in price, 
let the endowment in price guarantees be less than or equal to output, let marginal 
cost increase in output, and let target price be no greater than marginal cost. Then 
production rises with the level of endowment and with the target price. 
Proof: Denote the cumulative distribution function of price by J(P). The 
firm seeks to 
p 
Mm, I UlPy-C(y) +(/>„ -P)X,] dJ(P) * ? UlPy-C(y)] dJ(P) (") 
0 Pa 
The first order condition is 
/  U'[M][P -  C^(y)] dJ(P) + /  U'[N][P "  C(y)] dJ{P) = 0 (12) 
0 Pa 
where 
M =Fy-C(y)-^ (P^ -  P)X, 
N =Py -  C(y) 
Totally differentiating (12) with respect to Xq and y we find 
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dX, ? U" [M][P -C'(y)WG - P ]  d J ( P )  +  
0 
dy I iU'^ [M][P -C'(y)]^ -  U'[M] C" (v)]} dJ{]?) (13) 
0 
+ 7 KV" [N][f - C'(y)]^ - U'[N] C" (y)]) dJ{P) = 0 
Denote the second integral in (13) by A^, and the third integral in (13) as A^. 
Solving (13) for dy/dXo, we get 
ify/dX  ^ = -Î U"\M\W - C'MlPo-P]dl(P)l\A« (14) 
0 
Because C"(y) > 0, we see that the denominator is negative. Because the 
integration is over the set [0, Pq], we see that Pq - P > 0 in the numerator. 
Because Pq < C'(y), the numerator must be negative, and so output rises with 
the endowment. Now totally differentiate (12) with respect to Pq and y. The 
two terms found using the Leibnitz rule on the bounds of integration cancel, to 
leave 
dy * dyA^ * dPaxJi U" [M\\P -  C'mdHf) = 0 
0 
Tidying up we find 
dy/dPa ' - Î U"mW -C'(y)\ dJ(F)/\A^ > OH 
0 
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This theorem tells us that under incomplete markets, output will rise with 
increased price support if the target price is lower than marginal cost. 
25 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
By modeling the program participation decision as that of determining 
whether an option is fairly priced, we have developed a way of measuring the per 
bushel or per acre benefit to producers of any given set of program parameters. 
It can be shown that, because options markets exist, the U.S. deficiency payments 
scheme does not substantially alter planned production. It can also be shown 
that U.S.-type schemes encourage producers to participate in commodity options 
markets. In economies where no commodity options markets exist, U.S.-style 
deficiency payments schemes would have output expansionary effects because 
they reduce risk. This is a paradoxical result. U.S. producers have access to 
government-provided options and market provided options; producers in Europe 
do not have access to any type of options market. If, as now seems likely, the EC 
moves toward a U.S.-style deficiency payments scheme, the per-unit benefit to 
producers and the output expansionary effects will be higher than an equivalent 
scheme in the United States. 
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APPENDIX I 
Consider the CARA utility function U(Y(P)] where Y, income, depends on 
price, P. 
U[Y(P)] = 1 -
where A is the risk aversion coefficient. Income will be the sum of business and 
financial profits. Using GAUSS software, we numerically integrate utility with 
respect to the price density function 
J (l-e-^y(f)) dP = EU. 
O 
Denote the certainty equivalent return by c. It is the certain income that 
generates the same utility as a rislqr income distribution. 
1 - =EU 
.  ,  _ Ln[l  -  EU] 
(-X) 
To get an intuitive understanding of this procedure, draw a risk-return 
indifference curve. The CER is the point at which this curve intersects the 
vertical axis. 
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ABSTRACT 
The U.S commodity target price program can be considered as the issuance 
by the U.S. government of contingent claims to participating farmers. This paper 
models the acreage set-aside requirement as the premium paid for these 
contingent claims. A computable, equilibrium model of the interrelationships 
between program parameters, production, futures price, program cost, and 
producer benefit is developed. The model can accommodate stochasticity on 
either supply and\or demand. We use the model to estimate the expected 
government cost of the corn target price program in 1993. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. government uses a target-price, deficiency-payments scheme to 
support the income of most corn and wheat producers. The government 
guarantees to offset the revenue implications of a price outcome below a 
politically determined price floor. This price floor is called the target price. 
Since 1986, the guarantee relates only to a prespecifîed volume of output. It 
applies only if the producer agrees to leave idle a prespecified area of land. 
Thus, the benefit of program participation is a guaranteed price floor, while the 
cost of participation is the profit foregone due to the set-aside requirement. 
Gardner (1977) observed the similarity between the program and yet to be 
developed agricultural options contracts. Kahl (1986) suggested that it would be 
more efficient for the government to use options markets to stabilize producer 
income than to continue writing its own de facto put contracts. The 1990 Food, 
Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act legislated for the direct use of traded 
options markets as Kahl had suggested. This Options Pilot Program is available 
to producers as an alternative to existing target price and loan programs for 
some commodities in nine midwestem counties for the 1993 crop year. 
In this paper, we first show that the program participation decision is a 
straightforward cost benefit comparison that does not involve the individual's 
attitude toward risk. Because the participation decision is deterministic, we can 
impute, for any choice of target price and set-aside requirements, whether an 
individual will participate. Some additional knowledge of how producers will 
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respond allows us to predict nationally how much area will be set aside for any 
choice of program parameters. This in turn allows us to predict actual 
production, and the futures market rational expectations equilibrium response to 
this expected production. The model is closed by the direct link between the 
futures price and the option value. Model closure allows us to predict 
government costs, futures prices, and production for any given choice of program 
parameters. The last section of the paper implements the procedure using actual 
1993 data. 
Numerous simplifying assumptions are required to close the model and 
implement the procedure. These assumptions are used to overcome a lack of 
farm-level data. This data would be expensive to construct, but should be 
worthwhile given the ex ante farm program costs that can be measured. In the 
absence of this farm-level data, the procedures reported below will give a less 
accurate but, hopefully, unbiased measure of these costs. 
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2. PREVIOUS WORK 
There has been considerable analysis on the impact of government program 
parameters on crop supply. These include Floyd (1965), Lidman and Bawden 
(1974), Evans (1980), Lee and Helmberger (1985), Miranda and Helmberger 
(1988), and Perry et al. (1989). Of these studies, only one, Lee and Helmberger, 
attempted to model how supply would respond to a free market regime. This is 
because supply control of one form or another has been in effect for most major 
crops in the United States for all but a handful of years since the second world 
war. Gardner (1987) considered some of the political determinants of the nature 
and magnitude of agricultural support. Chavas et al. (1983) examined the 
acreage response to program parameters and futures prices. Marcus and Modest 
(1984) studied the input decision in an uncertain output price and quantity 
environment under a target price regime. In a subsequent paper, Marcus and 
Modest (1986) investigated the cost to the government of the price floor. None 
of these papers attempt to model the simultaneity of the interaction between the 
planting decision and the futures price at planting. 
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3. THE CONTINGENT CLAIMS MODEL 
Under the provisions of the 1990 Farm Act, a participant contracts to idle 
a certain fraction, a, of base acres (eligible acres), B, in return for a price floor 
guarantee, Pq, on a prespecified eligible per acre output, yg, for each of (1 - 0.15 
- a)B acres. The IS percent of base acres on which no deficiency payment is 
paid may be planted under any crop except fruits and vegetables. Assume that 
there is easy access to put markets, and denote the present value of a put option 
with strike price Pq as W(PG,Fg t) where » is the price at time t of a harvest 
date com futures contract. Because the producer can sell puts with strike price 
Pq to restore the position that would have pertained were there no program, the 
dollar value of the program benefits is 
(0.85 -  a) By„ IV(P^FJ. (1) 
We make the Black and Scholes assumptions (1973) concerning the economic 
and trading environment. The benefit of the program is identical to the cost of 
(0.85 - a) B yo puts expiring at the harvest date. Thus, using the standard value 
of a put option (Rubinstein, 1976), the program benefits are 
(0.85 -  a) By„e "'C-')  [P, N(-d,)  -  F„ N(-d^] (2) 
where t is the time index; 
t = T is time index value at harvest; 
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t = 0 is time index value at sign up for the program; 
N(.) is the cumulative density function of a standard normal distribution; 
di = NPyPo) + 0.5 (T - t)]/o (T -1); 
dz = [In(FyPo) - 0.5 (T - t)]/a (T -1); 
r is the prime interest rate; 
a is the implied volatility or the annualized standard deviation of the log of 
futures price. 
The cost is the present value of foregone profit from set-aside land. The 
idled land will be the 100 a percent of lowest economic quality land^. Let PV(.) 
denote the present value operator, let n(v) denote per acre profit from land of 
quality v, let v be indexed such that 0 ^ v ^ 1, and let j(v) be mass density 
function of v. Then the cost is 
a 
Bf PVln(v)]j(v)du.  (3) 
0 
If contingent markets are unbiased and complete, then on any part of land 
PV[7i(v)] profit can be assured. Thus, the participation decision depends on the 
sign of 
The land set aside might not be of the lowest quality because factors such as 
accessibility and field size may enter the set-aside decision (Hoag et al. 1993). 
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H . (0.85 -  a) By„e JV(-dj) - F, 
« 
-B f PV[n{y)\ j(y) dv. 
0 
Note that 
dH/da < 0. dH/dPfj  > 0.  
Having considered the participation decision of an individual producer 
will now aggregate up to the market level. 
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4. THE MARKET MODEL 
In this section, we develop a closed general equilibrium model of corn and 
soybean production, and of participation in the com target price program. 
Inevitably, several simplifying assumptions are necessary. We assume that there 
is a fixed stock of land, Aq. We set this equal to 143 million acres, the average 
amount of land either under corn or soybeans, or set aside to com in the crop 
years 1989/90, 1990/91, and 1991/92. This land is assumed to have only two 
uses, corn and soybean production. While not strictly correct, this assumption is 
not far from reality^. Let and Ap denote acres in soybeans, and total acres 
in the program respectively. Let denote acres in corn, but not in the program, 
surplus to the 0.15 Ap in the program on which no deficiency payment is made. 
Thus, Ag could be negative, but could never have value less than - 0.15 Ap. Then 
(5) 
The expression for total acres in corn is 
= A + (1 - «Mp- (6) 
We propose a technology 
6, = (7 )  
where Qj is total output of crop i; i = tc, sb; and kj A^' is yield per acre. Note 
^ To accurately implement the procedure we propose here, data would be needed to 
partition farms by size, base acreage allotment, region, land quality, and cost of production. 
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that 100 X dj is the percent change in yield per acre associated with a percent 
change in acres sown. In the agricultural economics literature, dj is commonly 
called the slippage coefficient. Henceforth we make the assumption that the 
coefficient is the same for both crops. 
Our ultimate intention is to find the rational expectations equilibrium futures 
prices and planted acres when output is stochastic. However, in order to develop 
intuition, we will first find the rational expectations equilibrium when output is 
deterministic and uncertainty enters through demand. We assume that per 
bushel variable costs, b, and b^y, are constant. 
Because there is a limit to the amount of land that can be placed in the 
program, the optimization problem involves two steps. First, we maximize the 
national profit function which is 
1. = (0.85 - .) * {F„ e -'M - b,}k, K + (1 - «M,]'" 
(8) 
* -bJK, \A„-A^ -A/^.  
Maximizing (8) with respect to A, and Ap, we get 
# " (fc, « K + (1 - (1 + à) 
(9) 
- {F^, e-'C-" - K - V (1 + d) . 0, 
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dn 
= {F,, - b,}k, [A^ + (1 - aMJ" (1 - a)(l + d) 
- e + d) 
+ (0.85 - a)>'o = 0. 
(10) 
Solving, we find 
and 
where 
and 
Ac = + (1 - «)^p = 
/ \ 
2i 
G, 
i /d 
(11) 
^.6 = % 
'3 
1/4 
(12) 
Gi = _ {JP,, e - ib,}*:. 
{f,», e -'(T-') - Ad,}*,»' 
(13) 
G, = (0.85 - a)y, IV(PM, (14) 
Therefore, 
«3 = -  U K a (1* d).  (15) 
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(l+d)/d 
Q c = K  (16) 
^3) 
and 
Qsb = ^sb G,G, 
Yl+d)/d 
(17) 
Now we have the indirect supply functions. The fraction may be 
interpreted as the ratio of program value to the producer to program cost to the 
producer. If, as we expect, -1 < d < 0, then both outputs will fall with a rise in 
this ratio. To close the model, we must establish demand relationships. 
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5. THE MARKET MODEL WHEN DEMAND IS UNCERTAIN 
If we assume a lognormal distribution with a known implied volatility, then 
all variables in the expressions G^, O2, and G3 are known at planting. However, 
and ^ are endogenous in that they in turn depend on the planting decision. 
Because W(Pq,Fc ,) depends on Fg „ it also is endogenous. We must close the 
model by considering the demand side. 
In their innovative paper, Marcus and Modest (1986) develop a partial 
equilibrium model to value the ex ante cost of the target price program. The 
model is partial in that it does not take into account either the aggregate effect 
of output decisions on the futures price, or the effect of the set-aside rate on the 
futures price. They assume that demand has a logarithmic relationship with both 
harvest date price and the Standard and Poor's 500 index. For realism here, we 
replace the S&P index with an index of livestock numbers, but otherwise adopt 
the Marcus and Modest assumptions. The resulting demand function is where 
QDj is the demand for good i; Fj ^  is the price of good i at time T; S^ is the 
livestock index at time T; q is a constant; and Y,, are elasticities. The value for 
Yj must be consistent with the volatility of futures prices. Given that at harvest 
supply is fixed, any change in the value of Sj will change Fj j so that (18) holds. 
Taking the log of both sides of (18), and using the relationship 
Elx"^] = {E[x]y + Var[x] 
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we get 
Y/c/ - (/c,/ = 0, (18) 
where Og, a, are the implied volatility of livestock numbers on feed and the 
implied volatility of the harvest price of crop i, respectively. Rearranging and 
taking the square root of this expression gives 
Y, = (19) 
Now, to develop a relationship from the demand side between futures price 
and livestock numbers, note that futures price depends only on time and livestock 
numbers, 
= ns,) .  
We assume that livestock numbers follow a geometric Brownian motion. Thus, 
dS, = S,  a, dz^ (20) 
and, 
dkf = Pg; (21) 
The term (Xg ^ is a random variable with standard normal distribution and Zg is the 
standard Wiener process. Now we can apply Ito's lemma, and adjust for the rate 
of return, to find 
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K + 0.5 a, — + r S — = 0. (22) 
dt dS^ dS 
For a comprehensive explanation of how this equation was arrived at, see Black 
(1976). Equation (22) is the law of motion describing how futures price changes 
as livestock numbers change, and as time changes. The boundary value 
conditions are 
QDliF,pSj) = c, Sl' F,'}' (23) 
= 0. (24) 
The first boundary condition states that the futures price at settlement must be 
consistent with the demand equation. The second states that if livestock numbers 
are zero, then the livestock economy has collapsed and there is no demand. 
Solving (22) subject to (23) and (24), we find 
Ï, -I. iV'iTXirW'sV-o (25) 
SD, = c, S," f,;'e '' . ^ ' 
At any time between planting and harvesting, the futures price Fj t must be 
consistent with the index, S„ and the quantity QD;"^. The expression 
^ The problem may also be viewed as a discrete process with two dates of interest. 
These are the date that planting and hedging occurs, and the date that harvesting and hedge 
lifting occurs. From this perspective, output is not a geometric Brownian process, but rather 
an initial condition at planting that has an associated lognormal distribution at harvest. 
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(y;r+0^(^)(r,-«i)"jl(r-O 
e 
is an actuarially fair premium on the futures price due to price uncertainty and 
the nonlinearity of demand. Fischer (1975, p 513) provides a good intuitive 
explanation of how this phenomenon arises from Jensen's inequality. 
We now have supply, (16) and (17), and demand equations, (25), for both 
corn and soybeans. As the supply decision is taken at planting (t = 0), the 
equations should be solved at t=0. Using (5), (11), and (12), we can now work 
back to find the equilibrium acreage allocation (A,, A^y, Ap). Finally, we have 
the expected cost to goverimient 
CG = (0.85 - (26) 
where F^' is the rational expectations equilibrium corn futures price. 
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6. THE MARKET MODEL WHEN SUPPLY IS UNCERTAIN 
In the previous section, we have shown how to value government cost when 
demand is uncertain. One of the more distinctive features of agricultural 
production is the uncertainty of supply. In this section, we will extend the model 
to incorporate output uncertainty'. 
Like the settlement price, output is observed only once. However, through 
the futures price, the market makes explicit its expectations of settlement price. 
This does not occur for output. Nonetheless, there are analysts capable of 
summarizing météorologie and other data into a stochastic process describing 
probable harvest output. For a more empirical discussion on the relationship 
between the crop output distribution and the price distribution, see Thompson 
(1982, 1986). 
The stochastic process describing harvest output is denoted by Qj ^ where t 
denotes a time index initialized at 0 for planting and T for harvest date. We 
assume that the process has initial conditions described by the number of acres 
planted 
Here Qj q is the exponential of the expected value of log of harvest output. 
Equation (27) may alternately be viewed as the mode of the lognormal output 
' The model can be solved with both supply and demand uncertainty but the only new 
element, correlation between the shocks, does not justify the amount of math involved. 
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distribution. It then exhibits geometric Brownian motion with zero drift, i.e. 
dQi = Qi Of Q dz, Q. (28) 
The constant OjQ in (28) is the annualized standard deviation of the 
instantaneous rate of change in expected output while 
^i,Q = *4/ (^0°^ (29) 
where Hj , is a random variable with standard normal distribution, and Zj q is the 
standard Wiener process. We must now distinguish between actual supply, Qj j, 
and the initial condition, Qj q. 
From the producer's perspective, the initial condition is the only control 
variable. He/She can choose only Aj which, through (27), determines Q|_o. The 
supply side relationship previously established between Qj_o and Fj o in equations 
(16) and (17) does not change. This is because at t = 0, (16) and (17) represent 
output predictions given the number of acres planted. At planting time, there is 
a perfect mapping between acres planted and expected output. At later times, 
because of output uncertainty, this relationship ceases to be perfect. To establish 
the demand side relationship, we need first to value the crop. 
Suppressing Sj in (18), we find 
Thus, at harvest the value is 
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(30) 
where V;(.) is the value of crop i. 
One of the consequences of assuming that absolute own-price demand 
elasticities are constant and less than one, is that the value of output is zero 
when the futures price is zero. If the absolute values of demand elasticities were 
greater than one, this condition would not hold. Thus, we have 
i.e. the value of the crop when F; ^ = 0. Note that because output is assumed to 
be lognormally distributed, and because the own-price elasticity is constant, 
futures price must also be lognormally distributed. Specifically, futures prices will 
evolve over time according to geometric Brownian motion. If the standard 
deviation of the log of futures price is Oj p, then 
This can be seen from the reasoning behind (19). An Ito's lemma expansion of 
Vj(Fj t) using Black and Scholes method gives 
When we solve this and impose the boundary value conditions, (30) and (31), we 
get 
= 0) = 0, (31) 
(33) 
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n^i,) = c, e (34) 
To develop a relationship between futures price and output, when output is 
lognormally distributed, assume that individual output is strictly proportional to 
national output®. From the geometric Brownian motion of Qj and from the 
functional dependence, 
(35) 
We apply Ito's lemma to get 
^ * 0.5 Q' 4s = 0. (36) 
St ag/ 
As in equation (22), this is the law of motion describing how futures price 
changes with the stochastic process for output, and with time. This is Black's 
(1976) partial differential equation except for the term r Fj which is missing 
because, unlike price, output does not have a trend due to interest rates. 
With boundary value condition 
® We could relax this assumption to: the log of individual output is perfectly linearly 
correlated with the log of national output. Losq (1982) makes this assumption. Alternately, 
we could permit imperfect correlation by incorporating CAPM risk pricing. Both relaxations 
complicate the model unduly. 
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and using a, p = Oi q/Çî, we solve to get 
Qij, = e -I, (37) 
Evaluate at t = 0 (planting time) to get the mode of the output distribution, Qj q. 
From (27) we know that the producer has control of the mode of output. Divide 
crop value (equation (34)) by Qj q to get a value (price) per unit of this concept 
of output, 
This price is lognormally distributed with variance of the logs equal to 
All the uncertainty has now been transferred, symbolically, onto price. 
Expression (38) can be viewed as a shadow price; the price a risk neutral or 
well-hedged risk averse individual responds to when allocating land to crop i. If 
Cj > 0, then the shadow price is less than the discounted expected futures price. 
This is because Çj > 0 implies a negative correlation between output and price, 
and so the expected revenue is less than the product of expected price and 
expected output. When there is no output uncertainty, then the producer 
responds to the price e''^, which arises in (13), (14), and (15). 
We return to equations (13), (14), and (15) in the production decision. 
(38) 
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Evaluating at planting and replacing with (38), we map 
(39) 
Gj - = (0^ - a) W(P^F,^). (40) 
and 
G, - AT, = {F,, «1-''"^'-'"^ - b,}k, « (1 * d). (41) 
Note that the formula for W(Pg,Fç o) as expressed in (2) does not change, 
because the quantity of puts granted by the government is fixed. We complete 
the system as before to get expressions for Q^q in terms of „ and Qg^.o in terms 
of Fgb,o- We now have four equations in four unknowns, {0^0, F^o, Qsb.o» Fsb.o)-
We solve the system 
Qcfi ^ 
N, (42) 
(43) 
Qcfi = Cc ^c,o' e -«c r (44) 
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sb "sbfl " » (45) 
by substituting out Q^ o and Q^ g, and then using numerical methods (GAUSS 
1988). Then we find {A^, A,, Ap} from (46), (47), and (48). 
=^0 ~^sb -^c (46) 
+ ( 1 - «M» = 
\/d 
(47) 
^sb = 
N,N, i/d (48) 
The equation for cost to government, CG, is (26) as given previously. 
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7. IMPLEMENTATION 
We have yet to specify the model's parameters. In a survey of the 
literature, Hoag et al. (1993) reported that estimates of slippage coefficients vary 
from - 0.25 to - 0.58. We will assume that it is equal to - 0.35 for both crops. 
The k] are productivity coefficients and will change over time. Their value was 
arrived at using a log-log restricted seemingly unrelated regression system, the 
details of which are outlined in Appendix 1. Adjusted to 1993, the estimated 
coefficients are kg = 4.5915 x 10® and = 1.375 x 10®, where output is 
measured in bushels and area is measured in million acres. We find c,, and c^y, 
the constant terms in the demand equations, using a log-log restricted seemingly 
unrelated regression system. The system is outlined in more detail in Appendix 
1. The estimated time and inflation adjusted coefficients are c, = 9.7316 x 10^ 
and Cgb = 3.6858 x 10'. We assume that variable costs, b^ and b^y are constant 
and equal to those available for Iowa in 1993. These costs are $1.08 per bushel 
for corn and $2.11 per bushel for soybeans'. The per acre base yield is assumed 
to be the national average of 105 Bu/acre (U.S. Feed Grain Council 1993). We 
assume that there are 76.62 million effective corn base acres^". 
' "Estimated Costs of Crop Production in Iowa, 1993." Iowa State University, University 
Extension, Ames, lA. 
The American Soil Conservation Service (ASCS) reports corn base acres for 1993 as 
82.2 m acres (USDA 1993). However, over previous years the maximum participation rate 
was 90.5 percent in 1987/88. To allow for the participation disincentive of payment limits, 
we assume a maximum participation rate of 92 percent. Payment limits are $50,000 and 
$75,000 per farm for deficiency payments and total payments respectively. 
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Marcus and Modest assume a zero basis and use, as we do, absolute own-
price demand elasticities of 0.3 and 0.4, respectively, for com and soybeans. 
These figures are from George and Kirby (1971) and are consistent with more 
recent estimates (Rojko et al. 1978; Collins 1985). The implied volatilities, o^ p 
and Og(, p, are assumed to be 0.2241 for com and 0.1575 for soybean as imputed 
from the Black formula and April 16, 1993 option prices for September at the 
money contracts. The interest rate is assumed to be 0.06 (6 percent), the prime 
rate in April 1993. 
We solved the model for CG as the government parameters (a, Pq) change. 
The results are presented in Figure 1. There are three regions: for Region 1, Pq 
for any a is so low that no one participates in the program; Region 2 is where 
some, but not the maximum, allowable acres are planted; and Region 3 where Pq 
for any a is so high that all base acres are signed into the program. Notice how, 
at a given set-aside rate, cost rises at an increasing rate with P^. This is because 
when everyone has entered the program, an increase in Pq no longer reduces 
plantings. Reduced plantings increase the futures price which, in turn, reduces 
the government cost. 
Using the actual spring 1993 target price of $2.75 and set-aside rate of 10 
percent, we estimate the spring 1993 expected cost of the corn program to the 
government to be $3.606 billion. This value is indicated on Figure 1. To the 
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extent that our assumptions are valid, the government could use Figure 1 to 
consider the costs of alternative program parameters. Table 1 contains some 
the model output. 
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Program cost 
(Billion $) 
9ar 
MS -
$3.61 Billion SJM 
Target price &* 
,« .XT \  \  0^1,  
Set-aside rate 
ijm ojm 
Figure 1. Expected government cost of corn target price program. 
NOTE: Arrows show 1993 program parameters and expected costs. 
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Table 1. Summarized model output 
a Po CG F, Q, F, Q, Ap A, 
Bill'n Bill'n Bill'n Mill'n Mill'n Mill'n 
$ $ bushels $ bushels acres acres acres 
0.00 1.60 0.102 1.94 8.01 4.63 2.00 75.62 5.67 61.71 
2.10 1.483 1.94 8.01 4.63 2.00 75.62 5.67 61.71 
2.60 4.384 1.94 8.01 4.63 2.00 75.62 5.67 61.71 
3.10 7.631 1.94 8.01 4.63 2.00 75.62 5.67 61.71 
0.08 1.60 0.00 1.94 8.01 4.63 2.00 0.00 81.29 61.71 
2.10 0.829 2.08 7.84 5.05 1.93 75.62 9.20 58.18 
2.60 3.137 2.08 7.84 5.05 1.93 75.62 9.20 58.18 
3.10 6.037 2.08 7.84 5.05 1.93 75.62 9.20 58.18 
0.16 1.60 0.00 1.94 8.01 4.63 2.00 0.00 81.29 61.71 
2.10 0.314 2.09 7.86 5.08 1.93 33.65 51.15 58.19 
2.60 2.018 2.26 7.66 5.55 1.86 75.62 12.39 54.99 
3.10 4.485 2.26 7.66 5.55 1.86 75.62 12.39 54.99 
0.24 1.60 0.00 1.94 8.01 4.63 2.00 0.00 81.29 61.71 
2.10 0.056 1.97 8.00 4.74 1.98 4.54 77.92 60.54 
2.60 1.157 2.36 7.56 5.86 1.82 62.58 26.79 53.43 
3.10 3.128 2.45 7.47 5.86 1.79 76.62 15.63 51.75 
0.32 1.60 0.00 1.94 8.01 4.63 2.00 0.00 81.29 61.71 
2.10 0.00 1.94 8.01 4.63 2.00 0.00 81.29 61.71 
2.60 0.741 2.22 7.70 5.46 1.87 33.84 53.60 55.56 
3.10 1.964 2.57 7.37 6.45 1.75 66.44 26.43 50.13 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
U.S. grain policies have recently changed so that deficiency payments are 
paid on historical rather than actual production. This virtual decoupling of 
production and policy allows us to place an exact value on the benefits to 
producers. This value depends on the current price of a put option with strike 
price equal to the announced target price. The cost of the program to producers 
is the income foregone on the acreage which must be set aside to meet program 
requirements. This cost will vary from producer to producer. Quantifying the 
cost requires information on the individual's land quality distribution. If this 
information were available, and if one assumed that producers make rational 
participation decisions, then one can predict the sign-up rate for any given set of 
program parameters. When producers join the program, they agree to take land 
out of production, which in turn reduces national production. Expected changes 
in national production influence the futures price, and in turn the benefits of 
program participation (through the option price). We have shown that the 
system described above is closed and, given the technologic and distribution 
assumptions made, that there is a unique set of outputs, prices, and participation 
rates for each set of program parameters. Closure allows us to calculate the ex 
ante cost to the government of any given set of program parameters. We 
demonstrate the procedure using 1993 price data and we show how expected 
government cost increases with an increase in the target price, and decreases with 
an increase in the set-aside rate. 
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APPENDIX I 
Using USDA annual data (U.S. Feed Grains Council, 1993) for the twelve 
crop years 1980/81 to 1991/92, we estimate the log-log production system arising 
from (7) to get 
Ln(Qe) = 19.805 + 0.01076 t + 0.65 Ln(A,) + e, (49) 
(194.8) (0.78) 
Ln(Q^) = 18.6 + 0.010701 1 + 0.65 Ln(A,b) + e,y (50) 
(351.9) (1.49) 
where 
Qi = national output for crop i (bushels); Aj = land sown to crop i (m 
acres); 
e; = error term for crop i; and t = year - 1980. 
Adjusted for time (adjusting to 1993), we arrive at the coefficients k,, and Iq^ in 
the text. For demand, we again use USDA annual data (U.S. Feed Grains 
Council, 1993) for the twelve crop years 1980/81 to 1991/92 to estimate the log-
log system arising from (18) with Sj suppressed 
Ln(QDg) = 23.141 + 0.010201 1 - 0.3 Ln[F, x /CPI] + u, (51) 
(192.8) (0.72302) 
Ln(QD,b) = 22.61 + 0.0097907 t - 0.4 Ln[F,i„T/CPI] + u,y (52) 
(354.5) (1.3578) 
where 
QDj = total use of crop i (bushels); Fj j = crop i farm price at harvest 
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($/bu); 
CPI = consumer price index (1985 = 1.00); Uj = error term for product 
and 
t = year - 1980. 
Adjusting for time, we arrive at the coefficients c^, and c^ in the text. 
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ABSTRACT 
Evidence is presented that suggests options markets are not optimal. An 
alternative market structure is proposed that would increase hedging 
effectiveness, and the risk return tradeoff for hedgers and speculators, 
respectively. Fewer derivative markets would be required per underlying asset 
than with options markets. The settlement price of these alternative markets 
would be some power of the closing futures price. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
To accommodate movements in the price of the underiying asset, options 
markets, as they are currently structured, require trading for both puts and calls 
at several strike prices. The need for multiple interdependent options markets 
per asset reduces liquidity, and by extension the number of markets that can be 
covered by options. Were it possible to replace these multiple options markets 
with a single independent derivative, then liquidity and market coverage would 
expand. For example, at any one time more than 20 crude oil futures trade, with 
expiration months stretching out three years. Active options markets typically 
operate only on the three closest to maturity futures, with, at most, six active 
strike prices per contract. Therefore, although 36 separate options prices are 
quoted on crude oil, options do not trade on most crude oil contracts. 
Among those options that do trade, measured implied volatilities have been 
found to relate in a systematic way to the time to maturity and degree of 
moneyness (Whaley 1982; Day and Lewis 1988; Stephen and Whaley 1990; Choi 
and Shastri 1989; MacBeth and Merville 1979). One possible explanation for the 
mispricing of out of the money, and far from maturity options, may be the 
relatively thin markets that exist for these contracts. 
The markets response to the problem outlined above is the development of 
customized options. These options are written by brokerage houses to satisfy the 
individual needs of large investors, and have been so successful in drawing 
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liquidity from standardized options markets, that the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) has initiated a program to customize contracts for other 
investors (Wall Street Journal 1993a). Over the first three months of trading, 
they have proven to be very successful (Wall Street Journal 1993b). 
One alternative to customization of options contracts would be a contract 
whose settlement price is some (power) function of the underlying asset price, 
rather than the difference between the asset price, and some arbitrary strike price 
as is currently used. For reasons that will later become obvious, we term these 
alternatives polynomial contracts. The purpose of this paper is to explore 
polynomial contracts as an alternative (or supplement) to existing options. One 
benefit of polynomials is the one-to-one linkage between the polynomial price 
and the asset price, thereby eliminating the need for multiple strike prices, and 
separate put and call markets. A second benefit is the replacement of a market 
structure that forces a discrete choice among strike prices, with a structure that 
provides a more flexible approximation to the optimal pay-off function. 
We begin with a description of polynomial contracts. Then we show that 
polynomial contracts evolve as a theoretically acceptable solution to a 
maximization problem where hedgers and speculators maximize utility by 
choosing among market structures, rather than the more traditional approach 
where agents choose optimal positions given a fixed market structure. Then, by 
means of Monte Carlo experimentation, we show that markets in and of 
maturity prices come very close to spanning the state space. We also show the 
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improvement in welfare (by means of certainty equivalent returns) that results 
from the move from options to polynomial functions. Finally, we provide a fair 
pricing formula for a class of polynomial contracts. 
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2. PREVIOUS WORK 
There exists an enormous body of literature concerning hedging with futures 
and options. Some of the work used mean-variance analysis (Wolf 1987). 
Hedging under the less structured expected utility framework has also been 
considered (Lapan et al. 1991; Benninga et al. 1984). Benninga et al. derived the 
optimum hedge ratio when today's futures price is an unbiased predictor of the 
futures price in the next period, and when the basis is independent of the spot 
price. Lapan et al. showed that under the Benninga et al. conditions, there was 
no hedging demand for options. However, if either futures or options are biased, 
then optimal hedging may involve options. Moschini and Lapan (1993) showed 
that options may be used when there are quasi-fixed inputs. 
There is another literature that deals with the adequacy of existing hedging 
instruments. Arrow (1964), in his seminal paper on risk bearing, established the 
concept of a complete set of contingent claims markets. Such completeness exists 
when a payout in any state, and only in that state, is possible. In the absence of 
transaction costs, this completeness is a necessary pre-condition for efficient 
equilibrium to exist under uncertainty. A set of options markets with a 
continuum of strike prices provides completeness. Hahn (1971) showed that, in 
the presence of transaction costs, completeness was not necessary, and in fact, 
may be detrimental to efficiency. If transaction costs are allowed for, an infinity 
of contingent claims markets cannot be supported, and an optimal set must be 
chosen. 
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Ross (1976) has shown that a small number of options can provide a very 
diverse range of payout possibilities. He established the concept of a portfolio of 
assets called the efficient fund. Options written on such a fund provide the same 
range of opportunities as options written on the individual assets. Ardetti and 
John (1980) demonstrated that, when the state space is finite, the probability of 
an arbitrary portfolio being efficient differs from one by an infinitesimally small 
number. Nachman (1986) showed that when distributions of asset returns are 
continuous rather than discrete, no efficient fund exists. Duffie and Shafer 
(1985) showed that for incomplete markets, equilibrium will exist except on a set 
of measure zero. Schachter (1986) proved that in the absence of transaction 
costs, the introduction of an option market at a new strike price caimot reduce 
welfare in the Pareto sense. 
Work has also been done that options may be optimal approximating 
instruments. Hauser and Bales (1986), among others, suggest Fishburn's (1977) 
target deviation utility specification as a motivation for the use of options as 
hedging instruments. While Holthausen (1981) has shown that Fishburn's model 
satisfies the non-Neumaim-Morgenstern expected utility axioms, the model labors 
under some of its attributes. It holds that marginal utility, below a known critical 
level of income, bears no connection with marginal utility above this critical level. 
The reasoning is that there exists critical disaster levels of returns such as 
bankruptcy or starvation. However, as a disaster looms, economic agents will 
usually be able to take action to escape. For example, firms will reduce the work 
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force, salaries or dividends, or enter Chapter 11. Another problem with 
Fishburn's model relates to the issue of defining the critical value. Associated 
with any particular production level, there is one critical price. However, if 
production or other prices are uncertain, there will be a range of critical prices. 
In addition, even if there are specific circumstances for which options are 
optimal, there is no guarantee that these circumstances are common. 
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3. POLYNOMIAL CONTRACTS 
A pofynomial contract with index i, and expiration date T, is a binding 
commitment to pc  ^on the expiration date, the price on that date raised to the i™ 
p o w e r ,  P t  
Polynomial instruments could be written on the underlying price or on 
futures prices. Their contract specifications would be identical to those of 
existing options except in the functional form of the payoff. They would have 
expiration dates and could be traded both long and short. 
We see a compelling connection between the econometric approach of 
flexible functional forms, and the demand for contingent claims. 
Econometricians have focused on polynomials, in part, because of their well-
known approximation properties. A fundamental theorem of real analysis, the 
Weierstrass theorem (Royden 1988), shows that on a closed interval, the set of 
polynomial functions can generate a linear combination which converges 
uniformally to any continuous function. While the set of polynomials is not the 
only set with this property, polynomials are known to have impressive properties 
in Banach spaces (Cheney 1966; Acheiser 1956). Essentially their flexibility 
ensures that they can approximate a large set of functions and accommodate a 
whole variety of error measurement criteria. Because of the nondifferentiable 
points that comprise the points of extreme deviation when options are linearly 
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combined, convex-error measurement criteria will penalize option-based linear 
approximations. 
One may wonder whether polynomials can adequately approximate positions 
that can be generated with options, but bear in mind that options positions may 
themselves be only approximations to optimal positions. However, for the 
moment, consider some typical options positions as being optimal. Figure 1 
shows how versatile polynomials are. They can be used to approximate all 
popular options positions. The long straddle can be approximated using two 
polynomial contracts, and the vertical bull spread requires three polynomial 
contracts. In each case, an equivalent number of options markets are used, i.e., 
the sandwich spread requires four separate options transactions, the purchase of 
two calls, with a middle strike price and the sale of puts with a low strike price 
and a high strike price. However, the three strike prices required to create a 
sandwich spread represent a total of six options markets as puts and calls are 
traded on each strike price. Thus, the total number of polynomial markets 
required to replicate these positions is, in all cases, lower than is currently used. 
In the next sections, we will provide some theoretical situations where 
polynomials have appeal. We will consider hedging when inputs are flexible, 
hedging when output is uncertain, and the use of contingent claims to speculate. 
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CALL LONG STRADDLE 
VERTICAL BULL SPREAD SANDWICH SPREAD 
p 
Figure 1. Replicating existing options positions. 
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4. OPTIMAL INSTRUMENTS FOR HEDGERS 
Let 7t(P) be the profit function. Let K(P) be the optimal payoff function, i.e., 
at a given price realization, P, the desired payoff from financial instruments is the 
value of K(P). Let f(P) be the market's perception of the price density function. 
Then the fair market value of any payoff function H(P) is 
= J H(F) m dP. (1) 
0 
Restrict the set of payoff functions to measurable functions G. The investor 
chooses from G the function K(P) such that 
E^n(P) + K(P) - i E/J[n(P) - (2) 
where H(P) is any other measurable function and EfU[-] is the expectation of 
utility with respect to the density function f( ). The profit function is convex in 
price (Chambers 1988)." Substitute into (2) above so that the optimal payoff 
function is that choice of H(P) which maximizes 
EUlitiP) + H(P) - MJ. (3) 
This suggests a strong relationship between the optimal payoff function, K(P), 
and it(P). 
"Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson have shown that expected utility maximizing hedgers 
will not use options unless the optimal payoff function is nonlinear in output prices. 
Possible reasons for this nonlinearity include quasi-fixity of inputs, yield uncertainty, and 
non-myopic expectations formation. 
78 
Proposition: Assume that there are no transaction costs and that financial 
markets are unbiased. Then for a risk averse producer the optimal payoff 
function is equal to the negative of the restricted profit function. 
Proof: From the concavity of U(') and from Jensen's inequality 
Ul £[)I(P)] } k £{ U[ic(P) + Ç] } (4) 
where (is a random variable with mean zero. Due to unbiasedness, the 
difference between any payoff function and its cost will be a random variable 
satisfying the conditions for (. In particular, the expression 
E [ii(P)] - u{P) 
satisfies the conditions for (. Replace i by E[ii(P)] - tc(P) to find that (4) is 
satisfied with equality •. 
If K(P) can be synthesized through existing financial instruments, then 
allocation of resources is efficient in the Arrow-Debreu sense (Arrow 1964). 
However, to ensure liquidity, an approximation of K(P) may be necessary. The 
approximation could be, for example, a Taylor's series local approximation 
(TSLA) 
K'iP) = «0 + a/ '' + + ^^36 (5) 
where when b = litis the conventional Taylor's series expansion. Polynomials, 
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as do most options positions, tend eventually toward infinity. We may wish to 
control the rate by specifying that 0 < b < 1. The coefficient a., is trivial, and 
may be ignored. For the TSLA, and assuming the absence of bias, the FOC w.r.t 
ai, ag and ag are 
Ef{U'{'n)[P - Ef{P)]) = 0 (6a) 
Ef{U'{7i)[P^ - EfiP^)]} = 0 (6b) 
E^{U'{ti)[P^ - Ef{P^)]} = 0, (6c) 
where EX ) denotes expectation with respect to the density function f(P). Solve 
for aj, a2 and a^ to get K*(P), the approximation to K(P). 
K\P) = a^P + + g/3 
It can be seen that the nonlinearity of the restricted profit function leads to 
optimal payoff functions that are also nonlinear in prices. Options contracts, as 
they are currently structured, have payouts that are piece-wise linearly related to 
the maturity price, and may not be as suitable to hedgers as contracts whose 
value depends on some power of the closing price. The power of polynomials to 
approximate nonlinear functions is well known. It points to the possibility that 
one or two carefully chosen polynomial contracts may provide a better 
approximation to the optimal payoff function than existing options contracts. The 
choice of these polynomials and the extent to which they might dominate existing 
options is presented in Section 4. 
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We next turn to the issue of hedging when output is uncertain. While output 
is observed only at harvest, futures markets will continually impute a measure of 
expected output from planting levels, weather data, and other relevant 
information. Denote by Q„ the process that the markets impute as output. 
Proposition: Let aggregate output, Q^, be lognormally distributed. Let the 
absolute price elasticity of demand, be constant, and let quantity uncertainty be 
the only source of price uncertainty. Consider a risk averse producer whose 
individual output, qj, is uncertain but who knows that the percent change in 
individual output bears a linear relationship with percentage change in aggregate 
output^^ 
q ^ = k  G ; .  ( 7 )  
If we assume that the basis is always zero, and that k and n are constants, then 
this producer always desires a nonlinear hedge. The optimal hedging instrument 
is a contingent claim in a power of the harvest date price, and this power value is 
i - S n -
Proof: In the absence of basis risk, we know that harvest date futures price, 
Fj, equals harvest date cash price, Pj. Because quantity uncertainty is the only 
source of price uncertainty, the futures price at time t < T is a function only of 
^^Losq (1982) and Sakong et al. (1993) consider the optimal hedge with options under 
this scenario. While they study the best hedge given existing instruments we optimize over 
market structure. 
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time to maturity, and the knowledge at time t, of the statistical properties of Q^. 
Treating Qx as a hypothetical security, which diffuses stochastically over the 
growing season, and using the lognormality assumption, it can be shown that at 
any time the following partial differential equation holds" 
^ + 0.5 = 0, (8) 
where Oq is the instantaneous variance of the log of Q,. 
Because the demand elasticity is constant we can develop the boundary value 
condition 
Ft = (9) 
where k^ is the constant of proportionality entering the demand equation. The 
other boundary value condition is 
UniQj^, = 0. (10) 
Solving (8) subject to (9) and (10) we get 
p = (11) 
Rearranging we obtain 
^^is p.d.e was developed by Marcus and Modest (1986). See Constantinides (1978) 
and Fisher (1978) for a discussion on hypothetical securities. 
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(12) 
Because Q, is lognormally distributed, so too is q,, 
q, = kQP = (13) 
This is because a lognormally distributed variable raised to a power is also 
lognormally distributed. From (13) we can see that at planting time (t = 0) the 
stochastic revenue function faced is 
Thus, to hedge completely, the producer will sell forward k kj'' 
contracts in a contingent claim on the l-n( power of the harvest date futures 
price, i.e., an instrument that pays off 
The result derived above can easily be extended to where the relationship 
between individual and aggregate production is 
where a^, ai,...,ni, n2,...are constants. As the absolute value of demand elasticities 
for agricultural goods tends to be in the range [0.05, 0.5], and r\ is comparable to 
(14) 
(15) 
83 
P in the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the expression (1 - nS) will usually be 
positive and probably less than one. Thus, under these conditions, producers will 
demand polynomials with powers in the range (0, 1). 
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5. OPTIMAL INSTRUMENTS FOR SPECULATORS 
Now consider the case of bias in expectations. Let the individual's 
subjective assessment of the price distribution be described by the density 
function s(p). To focus on speculation, the hedging motive is removed by 
specifying the problem in a pure lottery framework. In this case the goal is to 
choose from the set of all measurable functions, denoted by {G(P)}, the 
measurable function K(P) that maximizes 
J IJ{G(P) - M^PMP) dP (16) 
0 
subject to Mfj(P) = J G(P)f(P)dP 
0 
where f(P) remains the markets perceived density function. The solution, K(P), 
is not unique because functions that differ on sets of measure zero also maximize 
(16). It may be considered unique up to an equivalence set. A closed form 
solution to K(P) may not be possible. 
Consider the problem of speculation when price is normally distributed^'* 
and where the speculator concurs with the market's assessment of mean, but 
^'*Due to asymmetry, it is more difficult to prove this for the lognormal distribution. 
However, Monte Carlo simulations, provided later in this paper, suggest that an 
asymmetric polynomial position is an improvement upon existing options contracts. 
85 
believes that variance is higher than the market's assessment.^^ Let and Fj 
denote respectively a futures contract and a contract to pay the square of price 
on a future date on that date. The alternative sets of instruments are {Fj, Fg} 
and (Fi, option with strike price at mean}. 
Assume that the market believes that price has distribution f(P) which is 
N(|x,o^), but that the speculator believes that price has distribution s(P) which is 
N(|i,t^). As both price distributions are synmietric about \i, the best speculative 
position will also be symmetric about (i. Thus on each set of instruments there 
are two restrictions: symmetry and unbiasedness. Consider the polynomial 
position 
K(P) = ao + a^P + a^\ (17) 
Due to unbiasedness on the part of the market 
EjiciQ + a^ P + «2^ ]^ = 0. (18) 
This implies the restriction 
«0 = -"if - «21»^ - «2"^- (19) 
Due to symmetry 
^^Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson have shown that risk averse expected utility 
maximizing individuals facing a symmetric price distribution will use futures to speculate 
on the first moment and straddles to speculate on the second moment. 
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dK{P)/dP\^,^ = g, + 2a2H = 0. (20) 
Thus the position chosen will be of the form 
K(P) = a^(P^ - 2mP + - o2). (21) 
This position could also be arrived at by generating a set of orthogonal 
polynomials. For the normal distribution, such polynomials are called Hermite 
polynomials (Kelly 1967). Now take the expectation with respect to s(P) 
E^[K(P)] = fl2(n^ + - 2v? + \i^ - a^) = - o^) (22) 
The variance of profit is 
VarlProfil] = E^(proflt - EjProfll]f ] ,^3) 
= aiEi(P^ -2vP = OjWl-
To arrive at this result it should be noted that for the normal distribution 
EJ[P^] =11^+ 3\ix\  = »!'*+ 6\x^x^ + 3x\  
Now consider the position of a symmetric straddle about the mean, i.e. 
purchase a put and a call both with strike price p. Using the symmetry of the 
normal distribution, it can be seen that the market price for the put should equal 
that for the call. Denote the straddle by S. It's market price, V(S), is 
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Ki) -2j  IP -  W fiP) dP -  2ProblP > |i]  {E/iP\P > ii] -  |i}  
'EJiP\P>vi -  It 
The mean of a truncated normal distribution is 
Ef[P\P > n] = n + a <K0)/{l-4(0)}, (24) 
where: o = standard deviation of the distribution 
<|>(0) = (2%)^^ = probability density function of the standard normal 
distribution function evaluated at 0. 
0(0) = 0.5 = cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution 
function evaluated at 0. 
The expected speculative gain is the number of straddles purchased times the 
difference between the subjective and market values of a straddle, 
EJiProflt] = 2j[i» - tils(P)dP -20/(2,)») = A,{2(T - «)/(2n)"}. (26) 
Thus, 
K(5) = la/ÇZrtf^ (25) 
I» 
The variance of this gain is 
VarlProfit] = b^E^[i\P -  n|  -2( t - o)/(2nfy] 
= b2EJ[(P - |i)^ - 4 |P - ji I (t - o)/(2w)°'^ + 2(T - a^/it] (27) 
= - 2t^ + 2o^)/w. 
For each set of instruments, it is desirable that the ratio of mean profit to 
standard deviation of profit be high. This ratio, rather than the mean variance 
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ratio, is chosen because it is homogeneous of degree 0 in the money metric. For 
the set of instruments {F^, Fj} the mean to standard deviation ratio is 
(T2 - O2)/[2T'»]""5. 
For the set of instruments {Fj, option with strike price at mean} the mean to 
standard deviation ratio is 
{2(T - o)/(27i)0-5}(ii)0-5/(nT2 - 2T2 + 2(f)0^ 
= (2)"^(T - a)/(7iT2 - 2T2 +2O2)<'-5. 
When T = a, then the ratio is zero because expected profit is zero, but an open 
position ensures exposure to risk. To compare the two sets of instruments, take a 
ratio of the ratios, polynomial position ratio to the options position ratio 
D = (T2 - - 2T2 + (2^% " «)} (28) 
= ( t^  -  o^)(wT^ -  2t^ + 2o^)°-^ /  {2t^ ( t  -  a)}.  
This function is homogeneous of degree zero in t/o. D is not defined when t = 
o. However, when this is the case, we can use L'Hospital's rule. Differentiate 
with respect to x above and below and then evaluate at x = o. We find 
Liw,,, D = = 1.772 > 1. 
When X # o the function may be evaluated. Over the set {x: 0 < x < 1.835 a, x 
# o} D is greater than 1. Thus, the polynomial provides a higher level of 
expected return per unit risk undertaken than options, provided the speculator's 
subjective estimate of the volatility is less than 1.8 times the markets estimate of 
volatility. 
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Again, there is evidence that polynomials could allow today's multiple 
options markets be replaced with a smaller number of polynomial contracts, 
simultaneously increasing the usefulness of the markets to speculators. A 
measure of what the optimal contract would be and the degree to which 
participants would benefit, is discussed in the next section. 
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6. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS 
The theoretical exercises reported on in Sections 2 and 3 can never be 
completely convincing. This is true because one could always find a particular 
situation for which existing options markets provide a perfect payoff. It is easy to 
see that, to formally solve for a socially optimal set of contingent contracts, we 
must specify a mass density on each of all possible optimal payoff functions, and 
then specify a social welfare function aggregating the welfare of individuals. 
Nevertheless, these results indicate that, for at least some hedgers and 
speculators, suitably constructed polynomials would increase welfare. The 
purpose of this section is to report on Monte Carlo simulations to determine the 
extent to which these markets would improve on existing markets. The first set 
of simulations compares polynomial and existing options for a typical hedger. 
The second makes the same comparison for a speculator with private 
information. 
Hedger Simulations 
The simulations for both hedgers and speculators are based on a similar 
procedure. First, the economic situation is laid out. Optimal positions are then 
compared across market structures using certainty equivalent returns. This 
procedure essentially measures the point at which the indifference curve between 
risk and return that passes through the optimal position intersects with the y axis. 
As long as risk-return indifference curves do not cross, orderings of alternative 
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outcomes found using this procedure are consistent with utility maximization. 
The procedure is performed for an individual with a CARA utility function with 
low and high degrees of risk aversion. The procedure is further discussed in 
Appendix 1. The results presented in Table 1 compare the certainty equivalent 
returns (CERs) across a range of market structures. The first column considers a 
"no financial markets" scenario while the second column considers where futures 
only exist. The third, fourth and fifth columns consider a two market situation. 
In each case there is a futures market while the second market is, respectively, a 
contingent claim in P* and an option at the mode of the price distribution. 
Note that the latter can alternatively be viewed as a three market situation where 
there is both a put and a call at the mode. The final two columns compare the 
CERs for an individual who must trade contracts in blocks of 1,000 and 5,000 
bushels (columns 6 and 7), rather than the single bushel contracts that are 
implicitly assumed in columns 1 through 5. These last two columns are included 
because, from the perspective of the hedger, a primary benefit of the polynomials 
is the movement away from the discrete choices associated with strike prices. 
Therefore, a valid comparison of the benefits gained from changing market 
structure is the CER change associated with standardized contracts. The tables 
do not measure the additional benefits that would arise if polynomials permitted 
a reduction in the number of markets available, and so, through increased 
liquidity, reduced the bid-ask spread. 
The hedger considered is a 1991 Iowa soybean producer. This was the last 
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year for which published costs and returns were available. A restricted translog 
profit function was reconstructed using 1991 Iowa soybean production costs and 
returns.^^ Because output prices vary considerably and because we wish to use 
a property of the translog restricted profit function that is valid only at the mean, 
we considered total economic cost per acre rather than actual crop value per 
acre. Total economic cost per acre is imputed by placing a fair charge for equity 
capital and unpaid labor. Total economic cost per acre was $243.06 while per 
acre variable cash crop expenses amounted to $145.62. The translog restricted 
profit function, for a single output, is of the form. 
n = ExpIoq + «1 ln(p) + % (ln(p))^ + SJli 6, ln(w,.) ^29) 
+ % EJli 2^1 bfj ln(w,)ln(M/y) + c, ln(p)ln(iv,)] 
where n = profit and p, Wj are the output price and input prices, respectively. 
This may be considered as an approximation that is strictly valid only at the 
point of expansion. This point is where the log of prices is 0. At this point the 
share of output in restricted profit is a^, and the own price output elasticity may 
be evaluated as 
Bji = «1 - 1 + —. (30) 
«1 
If the input prices are known with certainty, and if a^ and a^^ are known, then we 
know the shape of the function which is the optimal contingent claims position. 
161991 Farm Costs and Returns, Iowa State University, University Extension, 
Ames, Iowa. 
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We take a soybean own-price supply elasticity, 0.4, from the literature 
(George and Kirby 1971), and using the previously stated farm economic cost and 
variable cash crop expenses we arrive at 
= (S243.r«45.62) ' 
" ®i) - -2.73008. (32) 
The ag coefficient is chosen to scale profit up to a level representing a large 
soybean producer. We assume that such an operation would generate a gross 
profit of around $100,000. An a^ value of Ln (100,000) generates a gross profit 
of approximately this magnitude. We assume that this is the profit function faced 
by a producer who places hedges on April 16, 1991, and lifts them upon contract 
expiration in November 1991. Integrating the profit function with respect to the 
density function imputed from contingent claims prices, we find expected profit to 
be $102,991.4. 
The mean of the lognormal distribution was calibrated so that expected 
settlement price is equal to the futures price. The variance is imputed from the 
Black (1976) formula using April 16, 1991 prices, the prime interest rate, and a 
close to the money call (600 c/bu). 
The most striking feature of the results presented in Table 1 is the increase 
in CER when futures markets are introduced. This is particularly true for the 
risk averse individual. Once producers have hedged the bulk of their price risk, 
options and polynomials are used to refine the hedge. This refinement is needed 
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Table 1. 1991 Certainty equivalent returns for a Spring hedge on Iowa soybean 
farm. E[n] = $102,991.4, o = 0.1915, n = 100,000 Exp[2.4944581 
Log(P/6.085489) - 0.5 (2.73008)Log(P/6.085489)2] 
Risk Discrete Discrete 
Aversion No Futures Futures Futures Futures Futures Futures 
Coeff Futures Only Option 1,000 bu 5,000bu 
0.00003 $86,675 $102,952 $102,953 $102,954 $102,952 $102,951 $102,937 
0.00008 $69,175 $98,235 $102,807 $102,861 $101,307 $98,066 $97,399 
due to nonlinearities in the profit function which cannot be hedged with linear 
futures contracts. In the absence of nonlinearities, neither options or polynomials 
would be used (Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson 1991). The increase in CER for 
hedgers depends on the degree of risk aversion. For low risk aversion, the 
futures market is sufficient to hedge effectively; but, at higher risk aversion, 
nonlinear contracts have a place. The polynomial contracts fare well in 
comparison with the existing options markets in the example. The increases in 
CER among the various options polynomial contracts is not large when compared 
to the $100,000 expected profit. However, when we compare the benefits of 
polynomials with the increase in CER when we go from futures denominated in 
5,000 bu to customized futures contracts ($97,399 versus $98,235), the increase in 
CERs with polynomials is more impressive. 
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Speculator Simulations 
Table 2 replicates the simulations performed in Table 1 for a speculator 
seeking to take advantage of private information on the moments of the price 
distribution. All of the speculation results involve positions set on April 16, 1993, 
and lifted on expiration of the November 1993 contract. The CARA utility 
Table 2. Certainty equivalent returns for Spring 1993 speculation with soybean 
contracts 
Risk Infor- Discrete Discrete 
Aversion mation No Futures Futures Futures Futures Futures Futures 
Coeff Gap Futures Only pOJ P" Option 1,000 bu 5,000bu 
0.00003 1.25|i $0 $55,652 $56,013 $56,006 $55,964 $55,652 $55,621 
fi/1.25 $0 $55,524 $56,013 $56,011 $55,957 $55,523 $55,465 
1.25o $0 $12 $1,676 $1,408 $1,283 $12 $0 
a/1.25 $0 $12 $1,888 $1,216 $1,649 $11 $0 
0.00008 1.2S|i $0 $20,869 $21,004 $21,002 $20,986 $20,869 $20,848 
(1/1.25 $0 $20,821 $21,004 $21,004 $20,984 $20,821 $20,794 
1.25a $0 $4 $628 $528 $481 $0 $0 
0/1.25 $0 $4 $937 $456 $618 $2 $0 
function is again used and the risk aversion coefficients are as in Table 1. 
Because initial wealth does not matter for the CARA function, the results are 
presented as changes in CERs. The same seven market structures are considered 
as in Table 1. For each of the risk aversion coefficients, there are four 
information divergences. In each case, a 25 percent difference between the 
market and the individual's opinion is considered. Case 1 is where the 
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individual's assessment of the mean of the log of price is 1.25 times the market's 
assessment. Case 2 is where the individual's assessment of the mean of the log of 
price is 1/1.25 times the market's assessment. Cases 3 and 4 are where the 
individual's assessment of the volatility of the log of price are 1.25 times the 
market's assessment and 1/1.25 times the market's assessment, respectively. Note 
that, whereas in Table 1 financial markets were most useful when risk aversion 
was high, now the reverse is true. Where there is a difference in the assessment 
of the mean of logs, a large CER is provided by the futures market. Nonlinear 
instruments increase the CER somewhat and polynomials perform slightly better. 
The magnitude of this gain is of the order of moving from a minimum futures 
contract of 5,000 bu to a zero minimum. 
Summarizing Tables 1 and 2, a futures market (i.e., a polynomial market 
with a power value of 1) would appear to satisfy most of the demand for 
contingent claims. To the extent that a demand for nonlinear payoffs exists, 
polynomial instruments, and in particular, low power instruments appear more 
useful than options. 
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7. VALUING POLYNOMIAL CONTRACTS 
Ignore for the moment interest rates, time value, and risk aversion. Assume 
that there are unbiased markets. To value consider the definition of variance; 
14 - E[(P - |i.« (33) 
where = expected value of price = Fj and (ij = i"* moment about the mean, i 
> 1. 
Expand ^2 to get 
fJ = ElP^] = 4. (^,)2 . * (f,): (34) 
where F, denotes the i™ moment about zero. Thus the value of the 
instrument is the variance added to the square of the futures price. 
In general 
£(i"] = 4. iFfi., - li(i-l)/2](,F^)%., ,35, 
+ ['•(<-1)(<-2)/6](Fi)'^;.3 - * (i-l)(-l)W 
where there are i terms. In summary, we can make two statements 
1. From the l,2,..,n™ moments of the markets' assessment of the future price 
distribution, the price of the contract that pays P" at settlement can, in 
efficient markets, be inferred; and 
2. From the 1,2,..,n™ polynomial futures prices in efficient markets, the n™ 
moment of the markets' assessment of the future price distribution can be 
inferred. 
These statements cannot be made about options because, to value options, the 
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price distribution must be completely specified. If we wish to accommodate the 
interest rate, r, time to expiration, T-t, and risk aversion in the polynomial pricing 
formula, we must also specify the price distribution. If we assume a lognormal 
distribution, we can dynamically combine the contract with the underlying price 
to purge the system of uncertainty, as in Black and Scholes (1973). 
Let Pt denote the asset price at time t and let Px be the asset price at 
termination. We need F,, the value of this claim at time t. Where convenient, 
we will express F; as Fj(PJ to show it's dependence on both the underlying asset 
price and time. We denote the instantaneous variance of the log of the 
underlying asset price as Op^. Continuing in the manner of Black and Scholes 
(1973), we arrive at their nonstochastic partial differential equation problem 
Wr) = Pi 
F,(0) = 0. 
The solution is 
(36) 
If the claim is written on a futures contract rather than on the underlying asset, 
then the relevant partial differential equation problem is that arrived at by Black, 
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Wr) = 
Fi(0) = 0, 
where X, is the futures contract price at time t. The solution is 
F.(X,) = gOJ,(f-i)o^(r-,)-r(r-,) (37) 
Note that the value of a bond, and the value of an ordinary futures contract, are 
special cases of (37). Further, (36) or (37) can be used to generate a 
polynomial base with which we can closely approximate the value of any analytic 
payoff function.^' 
^^Many businesses have exposure in two prices, i.e., feeder and fed cattle, or oil 
and exchange rates. Options instruments are not well suited to hedging any price 
interactions. A contingent claim on the product of the prices may be warranted. 
For two prices P, * and Pb,t the value of the cross product, Fa5,„ is Fgb.t = P. t Pb.t 
Exp[pab ®a ®b (T-t) + r (T-t)] where Oj and are respectively {Var[Ln(Pj,)]}^ and 
Cov[Ln(P,_t),Ln(Pbt)]/(o„Ob). 
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8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Options markets, as they are currently structured, evolved in a somewhat 
haphazard fashion. This paper asks how they might have looked had they been 
designed within an optimization framework. We describe an alternative market 
structure that may be more useful than current options markets to both hedgers 
and speculators and to the markets themselves. These polynomial markets would 
be continuous nonlinear functions of the futures price, and would be more closely 
linked to the higher moments of price than are existing options markets. 
Currently market operators are trained to think in terms of moments; yet 
they must act using instruments (options) that are not directly connected with 
moments. It is because of the consistency of the polynomial contracts with 
statistical theory that the valuation formulas for polynomials presented in this 
paper are so simple. Finally, unlike nondifferentiable options, polynomial 
contracts lend themselves to mathematical analysis. 
It is difficult to anticipate whether market participants would be prepared to 
undergo the learning process required to fully understand and trade polynomial 
contracts. Existing options markets often require an ability to manipulate 
position diagrams, calculate fair option values, and understand a relatively large 
vocabulary; yet, they have been extremely successful. Contracts traded on the 
square or square root of the underlying asset price, although not as familiar as 
options, require no additional aptitude for math. 
If markets began trading in polynomial contracts, the number of markets 
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required per underlying asset would fall by at least SO percent. This is true 
because the current structure requires trading in both puts and calls, whereas an 
individual could choose to go long or short on a single polynomial. Because of 
the direct link between polynomials and the underlying asset price, no separate 
markets would be required for each of several strike prices. Participants who 
expected large price moves could purchase a suitable polynomial, and if proven 
correct, could quite easily liquidate the position. This contrasts with existing 
options markets, where deep out of the money contracts are either not offered or 
very thinly traded. Also, investors can often find it difficult to sell deep in the 
money options at close to their theoretical values. 
It is difficult to determine how many polynomials per asset would be 
supported by the market. The number would be determined by market liquidity, 
much as the number of strike prices are determined today, but the total number 
required for each underlying asset, would be less than the number of options 
markets. Essentially the marketplace would decide the order of a Taylor's series 
expansion that is economically warranted. In simulations reported here, it 
appears that almost all the benefit of additional polynomials falls after two or 
three have been introduced. Thus it is possible that three polynomials could 
replace the four to five calls and four to five puts that typically trade today. Any 
reduction in the number of prices quoted per underlying asset would concentrate 
102 
market liquidity and consequently reduce bid ask spreads. By offering markets 
that provide more flexibility and lower transaction costs, the exchanges should 
benefit from an increase in market volume. 
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APPENDIX I 
Consider the CARA utility function U(Y(P)] where Y, income, depends on 
price, P. 
U[Y(P)] = 1 -
where k is the risk aversion coefficient. Income will be the sum of business and 
financial profits. Using GAUSS software, we numerically integrate utility with 
respect to the price density function 
J(l_e-iy(P)) dP =EU. 
Denote the certainty equivalent return by c. It is the certain income that 
generates the same utility as a rislqr income distribution. 
1 - Exp[-kc\ = EU 
. . Ln{l - EU] 
(-^) 
It is this value, expressed in $, that is reported in the tables. 
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ABSTRACT 
By approximating the expected value of a function, nonlinear in a stochastic 
variable, as the sum of values of a sequence of options, we gain additional 
insights about economic behavior under uncertainty. This is because the 
respecified behavioral equations contain probabilities and conditional 
expectations that respond in a predictable manner to changes in the probability 
distribution. The procedure is formally developed in the context of expected 
utility maximization when output price is stochastic. It is applied to three 
problems: to value a risky investment, to study production under price 
uncertainty, and to study the effect of price uncertainty on expected output when 
output can be modified in response to realized price. 
I l l  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of decision making under uncertainty deals primarily with the 
maximization of the expected value of a welfare function. This paper presents an 
alternative approach to analyzing this class of problem. To understand the 
marginal effect of an increase in uncertainty it has, in the past, been necessary to 
place restrictions on either the objective function, or the probability density 
function (p.d.f). It has also been necessary to be explicit about the meaning of a 
marginal increase in uncertainty, because different conceptualizations may not 
have equivalent economic implications [18]. Finally, the technologic 
environment must be well defined, because both the technology and the decision 
sequence may alter the effects of uncertainty [10, 30]. Economic results have, 
inevitably, been on a case-by-case basis. Knowledge has been improved through 
new perspectives [27,29], more complicated analytics [14], or the analysis of new 
situations [10, 30]. The intent of this paper is to present an alternative approach 
to the maximization problem. It is shown that particular techniques, widely used 
in finance and statistics, may be applied to problems in the economics of 
uncertainty. 
The earlier work on the effects of uncertainty on economic choices when 
nonlinearities exist were mainly graphical and intuitive in orientation [22,28]. 
By introducing the concept of a mean preserving spread (m.p.s) Rothschild and 
Stiglitz [25] and Diamond and Stiglitz [7] provided a more analytic theoretic 
foundation to research in the area. Using this approach, Lippman and McCall 
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[17] imposed structure on the product of income and the first derivative of the 
utility function to sign the effect of price uncertainty on the choice variable. 
Sandmo [27] restricted the concept of an m.p.s to facilitate a straight calculus 
approach. Much subsequent work has been approached from this perspective 
[9]. Uncertainty has been widely modeled as a global change from certainty to 
uncertainty [10,29], where Taylor series have proved useful, or as a very 
structured marginal change in uncertainty [3, 9,21, 30]. In particular, mean-
variance analysis has been used extensively in economic models of production 
[24]. The most general and insightful approach has been through stochastic 
dominance techniques [5,21,23]. 
In seeking to attribute meaning to the interaction between the objective 
function and the p.d.f, this paper departs from the traditional approach to 
optimization under uncertainty. In this paper, we show a link between the 
second derivative of the objective function and the cumulative density function 
(c.d.f). To show that the technique has promise, we apply it to three of the most 
widely studied problems in the uncertainty literature. First, to develop the 
intuition, we use the methodology to place a bound on the value of a risky 
investment. The second application, the response of production to a marginal 
increase in uncertainty, strengthens existing results. The final problem addressed 
is the effect of a change in the structure of the profit function on expected 
production when price is uncertain. 
The main body of the paper has four sections. First, we develop the 
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technique in a very general context. We finish the section with an identity 
equating the conventional expression of expected welfare with an alternative. 
Analogues of this alternative expression are used to generate results in sections 3, 
4, and 5. Section 3 deals with valuing a risky investment. Sections 4 and S deal 
with production under uncertainty and expected profit under uncertainty, 
respectively. Finally, the paper is summarized and conclusions are drawn. 
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2. THE MODEL 
For the purpose of illustration, we will develop the model in the context of 
maximizing expected utility. Consider a continuous, piecewise linear 
approximation to a three-times differentiate concave utility function. Because 
utility specification is unique up to a positive linear transformation, we can 
normalize. At the lowest possible income level (price is zero), we can set utility, 
U, equal to income, Y, and set marginal utility equal to 1. For simplicity, let the 
approximation consist of three segments. Let and Ag be the income levels 
where marginal utility changes. The approximation is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
\ Y for Y ^ 
(1) 1/ « I + a,(y - A^) for A^ < Y ^ A2 
I " A) + ~ ^2) Z®'* ^2 ^ ^ 
Let 
(2) Y  =  P Q -  C i Q ) ,  
where Y is income, P is stochastic price at the marketing date, Q is output, and 
C(Q) is the cost function. Let and P; be the prices where marginal utility falls 
from 1 to a^, and from a^ to a2 respectively. 
+ C«?) (3) •• Pj = 
(4) Pz = 
<? 
4 + C(Q) 
Q 
Denote the probability distribution function of price by f(P). The problem is to 
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Slope 
Slope a-j 
Slope ao = 1 
Y A1 A2 
Figure 1. Approximation of utility function. 
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maximize 
p, p, 
E m m  «  j [ P Q - C i Q ) \ f i P )  d P  ^  f [ A , * a , [ P Q - C { Q ) - A , } \ f i P ) .  
(5) _ 0 
+  f l A i + a ^ ( A ^ - A ^ ) + a ^ [ P Q - C ( Q ) - A 2 ] ] f ( P )  d P .  
Consider Figure 2 where three lines; Bl, B2, and B3 are drawn. If these 
functions are added, we get the supporting, continuous, piecewise linear function 
in Figure 1. Bl is linear in Y with slope 1. B2 is zero for all Y lower than 
and has slope a^ - 1 after that. Observe that in the financial markets literature, 
this is a written call^®. It shows the payoff from a^ - 1 calls written on Y, where 
the strike price is A^. B3 may be interpreted as aj - a^ calls written on Y, 
where strike price is Ag. If we rearrange (5), we get 
E[U(Y)} « £[P]<? - C«?) - {1 - ai)Prob(P>Pi){E[Y\P>P^] - A^} 
(6) 
- {fl, - a^}ProbiP>P2){E[Y\P>P^] - A^l 
It can be seen that (6) is expected income plus a weighted sum of expected losses 
from written calls. Now, refine the approximation so that there are n piecewise 
continuous linear segments. Reformulate the problem so that a^ = 1 always, and 
that Aj and aj do not have the same numerical values as in equation (S). P; is the 
A purchased call is a contract which grants the purchaser the right, but not 
the obligation, to purchase a specified asset at specified future date for a specified 
price (strike price). The option will be exercised only if the asset price on the 
specified date exceeds the strike price [18]. A written call is the obligation to sell 
the asset if the call purchaser wishes to buy. 
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B1 : Slope = 1 
A2 
83: Slope = ë2-ai 
Figure 2. Position diagram decomposition of approximation to utility function. 
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critical price at which marginal utility changes from a^.i to a,. From equations (3) 
and (4), it can be seen that P| is a function of Q, and may be written as P|(Q) to 
emphasize this relationship. Yj is the income at that critical price. The 
approximation may be written as 
E[U(Y)] « EIPIQ -  C(Q) - E f i r -  y)) dP(a ,.i -  a,} 
i-i 
(7) 
= - a,). 
<=i 
Note that aj.i - aj, when divided by - Aj, is a discrete approximation to 
U"iY). It is necessary, before going further, to summarize some concepts in real 
analysis. We wish to show that an integration may be substituted for the 
summation sign in equation (7). In Appendix I, we show that jiX ~ /(f) àP 
is Stieltjes integrable with respect to a,, and that, at the limit, we may substitute 
U"(Y^ dY^ for a; -aj.i. The implication is that, at the limit, equation (7) becomes 
(8) E[U{m = E[y] + / U"(Yt)f(Y -  Y^)f{P) dP dY^. 
Noting that Yj = PjQ - C(Q), we may write (8) as 
(9) E[Um = £[n + <?/ U"{Xi)fiP -  Pi)f(P) dP dY, 
We note that the inner integral J(P -  f,) f(P) dP is the value formula for a 
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call option with strike price Pj. Equation (9) may be viewed as comprising two 
parts; expected income, less the limit of a weighted summation of call options. 
The second part, in turn, is comprised of two components. One component is 
due solely to the curvature of the objective function, and does not arise from 
uncertainty. The other component is due to the interaction of the curvature of 
the objective function and the price uncertainty. This interaction dependence 
would be eliminated if price were nonstochastic. 
An alternative interpretation of (8) and (9) is to view the function 1 - as 
a probability measure. Its value at is 0 by construction. If the utility 
function is concave, then 1 - {/Ms monotonie increasing, while if we assume that 
marginal utility at infinite income is zero, then the function has a maximum value 
of one. The requirement that marginal utility converges to zero is often imposed 
to avoid the Menger's super St. Petersburg paradox [10]. From this perspective, 
the second term on the right in equation (8) can be viewed as the negative of the 
first moment of qJ(P - f,) fiP) dP with respect to the measure 1 - V. Using 
equation (9), or its analogues, we now proceed to our three applications. 
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3. THE VALUE OF A RISKY INVESTMENT 
The problem here does not involve an optimization, but rather the 
quantitative measurement of the value of a given investment. In this section, the 
economic agent faces no choices; we seek only to understand the effect of 
uncertainty on equation (9). First we note that, because U" < 0, any factor that 
influences call prices uniformly, regardless of strike price, will have a determinate 
effect on expected utility. Merton [19] has shown that a mean preserving spread 
(m.p.s) cannot decrease the expected value of a call option, and will increase the 
value of a call at some strike price. Thus, any m.p.s reduces the expected utility. 
This conclusion concurs with a proof by Rothschild and Stiglitz [25]. 
We will now, by imposing the restriction of increasing failure rate (i.f.r) on 
the p.d.f, develop a lower bound on the value of investment. A distribution is 
globally i.f.r if, and only if, for each price, the density function divided by one 
minus the c.d.f is increasing in P for all P. The exponential distribution is 
globally constant failure rate, i.e /(f )/[ 1 - F(P)] is independent of P. The 
normal distribution is i.f.r while the Gamma and Weibull distributions will be 
either globally i.f.r or nonmonotonic [2]. The lognormal distribution has a 
nonmonotonic failure rate. We now present a lenmia from Henin and Ryan 
[11]: 
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Lemma 1: If the distribution of change in price between now and date of sale is 
independent of present price, and if the distribution is if.r, then the log of the call 
value is concave in present price. 
The present price provides information concerning the distribution of price 
at date of sale. Let us respecify ~ ^<) /(f) àP as 
J (e + P, - P,) g(e) de. Here is the present price, e is the price jump 
between now and date of sale, and g(e) = f(P). Denote the value of a call with 
present price P, and strike price P; as W(P,,Pi). If we differentiate W(Pt,Pj) with 
respect to present price we get 
^ - / *(«) </6 = 1 - G(P, -/>,) = ! -
where G(.) is the c.d.f of e. A second differentiation gives 
d^W 
dP, 
= giPi -  P,) = f(Pi) '  
The concavity of the log of the call value in present price implies 
\2 
W(P„Pt) (d^w) 
[ d p ^ l  k, 
< 0 ,  
or 
0 < W(P^Pt) < jdWIdP,? ^ [1 -
d^WfdPf /(f<) 
Now we can state 
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Lemma 2: If the distribution of change in price between now and date of sale is 
independent of present price, and if the distribution is ifr, then a lower bourui on 
expected uti l i ty is  E[Y\ + Q'^E[U"(y){H{P)y'^ ' \  where H(P) is 
/ ( /»)/[  1  -  F(P)].  
Proof: From equation (9) 
E [ U ( Y ) ]  = E [ Y ] + Q f  U " ( Y ^ ) [ f ( P  -  P , ) / ( P )  d P ]  d Y ^  
^1- f, 
= £[n + <? / W{P^P^) 4% 
> E { Y ] * Q j  U " ( , Y ^ )  {[1 - F(P)f|fiP^)) dY^ 
= E[Y] + Q^fu'XYi) lHiP^)r^f(P) dP^ 
0 
= E[Y} + Q^E[U"iY){HiP)y^\ Q.E.D. 
We can further note that 
E[U{Y)]>E[Y\^Q^E[U"{Yy\E[iH(,P)y'^\  *Q^Cov[U"m,mP)r\ 
but dH'VdP = - 2 H'^(dH/dP) < 0 because the density function is i.f.r. Thus, 
the covariance is positive (negative) according as U"'(Y) < ( > ) 0. We can say 
that, holding EiU'XY)^ constant, the lower bound rises (falls) according as 
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U"'(Y) < ( > ) 0. 
In summary, in this section using the assumption of i.f.r, we developed a 
lower bound on expected utility. In the next section, we will model uncertainty 
when there is a decision variable. 
124 
4. PRODUCTION UNDER PRICE UNCERTAINTY 
Sandmo [27] has shown that a risk-averse decision maker produces less 
under price uncertainty than under price certainty when the production decision 
cannot be modified in the light of subsequent knowledge. Ishii [14] proved that 
nonincreasing absolute risk aversion (non-IARA) is a sufficient condition for 
quantity to fall under a Sandmo type, marginal increase in price uncertainty. 
Turnovslqr [29] has shown that, when production can be altered later, a risk 
averse decision maker may plan to produce either more or less than his/her risk 
neutral counterpart. Some recent work in this area has imposed restrictions on 
the form of the production function [16]. An alternative approach has been to 
impose restrictions on the structure of utility [4,12,16]. Yet other papers have 
placed different restrictions on the nature of the mean preserving spread (m.p.s) 
occurring [8]. Meyer and Ormiston [20] applied stochastic dominance to show 
that there exist no economic situations for risk averse agents where the choice 
variable changes uniformly in direction for all mean preserving spreads. They 
also show that a m.p.s such that all shifted density is relocated to outside the 
support of the original density function will always reduce output. Davis [6] 
provided a good analysis of why the production effects of a m.p.s have proven so 
problematic. 
This paper returns to the issue addressed by Sandmo and by Ishii: what is 
the most general condition under which a risk-averter's production falls as price 
uncertainty (in the form of a m.p.s) increases? Risk-neutral producers ( U" = 0) 
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will, in Sandmo's model, produce the same before and after a m.p.s in price. In 
this section, we will show that U" < 0, and a mild condition on the nature of the 
m.p.s are sufficient to ensure that output falls with a m.p.s in price. 
In contrast to the previous section, Q is no longer fixed but may be chosen 
ex ante. As some of the material in this section involves tedious mathematics, we 
abbreviate the steps here and include expanded versions in the appendices. Let 
us note that = - C(Ç), and that = [y, + C(Ç)]/Ç. Differentiate 
equation (8) above using Leibnitz rule on the variable bounds of integration (see 
Appendix II). After some manipulation, we arrive at 
-  C/ + /  U"(Yt)f{P -  C'}f(P) dP dYt 
(10) 
+ C'U'XY^)QE[Ph 
where we let C denote marginal cost, and U"{Y^ be U"(Y^) evaluated at 
Y^. Sandmo has shown that under uncertainty, E[P\ > C'. The term 
C'U'XY^QEIP} is negative. The expression ~ C4/(f) dP is always 
positive, so the term J U"(Y)- C') f(P) dP dY^ is always negative. Now 
f, 
assume that Q satisfies the first order condition. If a m.p.s occurs, it affects only 
the expression 
(11) B  =  f  U"(Yf ) f{P - OfiP) dP dY^. 
As in Sandmo let us assume the second order condition. 
126 
(12) < o. 
dQ^ 
Before going further, let us consider the most basic m.p.s from which all other 
mean preserving spreads can be constructed [25]. See Figure 3 below. Two 
chunks are removed from the mass, and two are added. The one removed at the 
lower price is added at an even lower price, while the chunk removed at the 
higher price is added at an even higher price. This is done so that expected price 
does not change. Loosely denote the four areas where density changes by as 
the highest, then P^, Pg, and P4, the lowest. We call the density change around Pj 
the j™ part of the density change. It can be shown that if one, two, or three 
parts of a m.p.s occur at a price less than C, then for all values of P, the 
expression - C') fiP) dP rises with the m.p.s (see Appendix III). Using 
the Rothschild and Stiglitz (R&S) step function concept of a m.p.s, we can build 
a more general distribution that is a m.p.s and reduces output. All distributions 
whose difference from the original distribution can be decomposed into R&S 
m.p.s functions such that for each function one, two, or three parts occur at prices 
less than C will increase the value of JiP - CO /(P) dP regardless of the value 
of Pj. One such distribution is illustrated in Figure 4 below. This distribution is 
built up from m.p.s functions where two parts of the spread occur at either side 
of marginal cost. In this case there can only be one crossing of the c.d.fs. 
However, when we build up a m.p.s from combinations of all three cases, then 
three, or any odd number of crossings can occur. To see this let three parts of 
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Density 
function 
f(P) 
h{P) the m.p.s. function 
Figure 3. Basic step function mean preserving spread. 
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Cumulative 
density 
function 
Original c.d.f. 
Mean preserving 
c.d.f. that will 
reduce output 
Figure 4. Cumulative density function of an output reducing, mean preserving spread. 
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one simple m.p.s, call it A, occur below marginal cost, and let one part of 
another m.p.s, called B, occur below C\ The situation is described in Figure 5 
below. Let the one part of m.p.s B below C' be closer to C' than the three 
parts of A, and let the size of the step, «g, be large relative to the size of the 
steps in A. Having adjusted for these two simple m.p.s functions, the new c.d.f 
will first rise above the old one, return to it, fall below it, and then rise above it 
again before price exceeds marginal cost. As the part of the m.p.s that is at the 
highest price, whether it is from A or B, is always positive in direction of 
displacement, the new c.d.f will always rejoin the old one from below. Thus an 
odd number of crossings of the c.d.fs must occur for any mean preserving density 
shift. For the m.p.s shifts A and B considered here, the second and third 
crossings occur because Pi can be arbitrarily large. 
We are now in a position to state the central result of this section. 
Theorem 1: If  U"{Y) < 0, the second order condition holds, and a m.p.s can 
be decomposed into R&S m.p.s junctions where for each function one, two, or three 
parts are below C', then quantity falls with the m.p.s. 
Proof: We have shown that under these conditions, the value of 
J{P - C^}f(P) dP increases for all P;. Thus, 
p m m 
B = j  U"iY^) ~ C) f{P) dP dYi must fall with a m.p.s. But this is the only 
term in (10) that is affected by the m.p.s. Therefore, the right hand side of (10) 
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p.d.f 
crossing crossing crossing 
Figure 5. A mean preserving spread that reduces output, and that has a three crossing 
cumulative density function. 
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becomes negative and Q must change to restore equilibrium. But from equation 
(12), the right hand side of (10) falls with an increase in Q. Therefore, Q must 
fall. Q.E.D. 
As this type of m.p.s is a special case of second degree stochastic dominance 
(SDSD), we cannot infer that SDSD is sufficient to ensure a fall in output. 
Theorem 1 provides an interesting viewpoint on Sandmo's result that a global 
increase in risk reduces output. When price is certain, marginal cost equals 
expected price. In this case a m.p.s necessarily involves moving density from not 
above C down to below and moving density from not below C to above it. 
This situation is covered by theorem 1. 
We will now show that output may rise under risk aversion when both the 
expected price falls and the price distribution is more dispersed. We introduce 
the concept of a mean altering spread. Viewing Figure 3, a mean reducing 
spread is where more density is removed from around P3 and added to around 
P4, or less density is removed from around Pg and added to around P^. A mean 
increasing spread is where more density is removed from around Pg and added to 
around Pj, or less density is removed from around P3 and added to around P4. 
The following, somewhat counter-intuitive, result places an upper bound on the 
possible strength of results concerning the effect of price uncertainty on 
production. 
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Theorem 2: For any mean reducing (increasing) spread, there exists a concave 
utility function with U'"(Y) > 0 such that production rises (falls). 
Proof; See Appendix IV. 
Unlike Theorem 1, in Theorem 2 it was not necessary to impose restrictions 
on the m.p.s. These two theorems are worthy of some comments. The second 
lemma concerns self-protection. If expected price falls, there is a disincentive to 
produce, but there may also be an incentive to produce more in order to reduce 
the probability of a heavily penalized low income. As the distribution arising 
from a mean reducing spread is always second degree stochastically dominated by 
the original distribution, it is plain that being dominated in the SDSD sense is 
not a sufficient condition for output to fall. Another point is that Ishii's 
sufficient condition on utility structure (non-IARA) for a marginal m.p.s to 
reduce output relates only to Sandmo's restrictive form of m.p.s. For the more 
general m.p.s, it is not clear that Ishii's condition is sufficient because no 
structure is placed on how density is moved about. We can also see from 
Theorem 1 that any m.p.s that is confined to extreme price levels will reduce 
output if the second order condition holds. The price squeeze of Eeckhoudt and 
Hansen [8] and proposition 3 of Meyer and Ormiston [20] are special cases of 
this phenomenon. Finally we note, as did Meyer and Ormiston, that U" < 0 is 
not a sufficient condition for production to fall under a m.p.s. Choose a R&S 
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m.p.s where either no part or four parts of the function are at prices below C\ 
At the part of the spread where the the value of J(P - C) f(P) dP decreases, 
let the absolute value of U" be sufficiently large to cause B to rise with a m.p.s. 
In this case, output will rise with this particular m.p.s and utility curve. 
We now apply the technique to a third problem; how output price uncertainty 
affects the expected output of an expected profit maximizing firm with some 
flexibility in choosing output after price is realized. 
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5. OUTPUT UNDER PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY 
There has been much work done on the implications of technologic flexibility 
when the output price is uncertain. Oi [22] demonstrated that price uncertainty 
may benefit producers. Tisdell [28] provided the analogous result for input price 
uncertainty. The issue of choice of equally flexible inputs under output price 
uncertainty has been addressed by Batra and Ullah [1]. They show that when 
some, but not all, inputs can be chosen after output price has become more 
certain, a nonlinear utility function is not necessary to motivate altered decision­
making. They also show that the presence of uncertainty does not change the 
ratios of marginal productivities. Tumovsky [29] found that the ratios do change 
if inputs have different levels of flexibility. He also shows that, in a model of 
quasi-fixed inputs, planned production may rise or fall due to output price 
uncertainty. This is because flexibility encourages extra investment, whereas risk 
aversion discourages it. Hartman [10] applied Jensen's inequality to show that, if 
the marginal value of the quasi-fixed input is concave (convex) in output price, 
then optimum quasi-fixed investment falls (rises) with uncertainty, provided that 
the marginal product of the quasi-fixed input is an increasing function of output 
price. Epstein [9] generalized somewhat on Hartman's results. Wright [30] took 
a more detailed look at the effect of flexibility on variable factor use and factor 
proportions under output price uncertainty. He showed that input and output 
price uncertainty were very similar in effect. This section will consider the 
effects of uncertainty on production for an expected profit maximizer. 
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In this section, we will first develop an expression for expected profit in terms 
of options. We will then use the expression to find expected output and 
properties of expected output. Define a firm's decision making process as 
follows: first quasi-fixed inputs are chosen, then output price is revealed and, 
using this price information, variable input choices are made. Consider a profit 
function where technology is somewhat flexible so that the function is convex in 
output price. We consider a firm that seeks to maximize expected profit. As 
before, we approximate the profit function in a piecewise linear manner. To 
illustrate, assume that there are three segments. Let Ag be the approximate 
profit when price is zero. Let bg, b^, and b2 be the marginal responses to price 
over the first, second, and third segments respectively. The profit levels at which 
marginal response rates change are between the first and second segment, and 
Ag between the second and third segment. The approximation is then 
I Aq + b^P for ic ^ i4, or P<P^ = 
(13) ii(/») a I i4,+Z>i(P-Pj) ^ or fg ^ f < fg = f 
A  - A  
I Xg + 62(f - J^) for Aj^<n or P^=P^+ 
Now the approximate expected profit function may be written as 
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Pi 
(14) 
£[ii(P)] « /Mo + b^P]fiP)dP + fiA^ + b^iP -  P^)]fiP)dP 
0 P| 
+ f lAi * -  P,)] f(P) dP. 
= ^ t »„£[P] * flA,-A„* (», - »o)P - <0> 
0 
+ f lA^-A, + (b^ -  + b^P^ -  b^PiViP) dP. 
As before, introduce more segments to refine the approximation, and then take 
the limit. 
£[iï(P)] = A^ + b^E[P] 
* //["'( f ,)  * Pn'XP,) -  P,lt"(P,) -  ll '(P,)l /(P) dF dP, 
(15) ii, 
= X, + + f / (f - P,)/(P) dP dP,. 
0 P, 
We see at once from (15), Oi's result that expected profit rises with a m.p.s 
because the value of a call rises with a m.p.s. We can also place bounds on the 
value of expected profit, using arguments similar to those presented when we 
considered the value of a risky investment. 
We now postulate a subsidy that does not affect second, and higher moments 
about the mean. Adding a price subsidy, s, the expected profit becomes 
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(16) E[n(P+s)] = Af,  + b^E[P*s] + fn"iPt)f(P+s-Pt) f(P) dP 
0 p, 
Differentiating with respect to s we get 
(17) dE[n(P+s)] ^ + Jit 'XP,) [1 - F(f,)] dP, 
as 0 
If there is a support [Dj, D^] on the density function, then (17) may be rewritten 
as 
) + /,"(?,)[!-F(f,)| dP, 
ds i. 
This relationship may be viewed as the welfare effect of a subsidy for a risk 
neutral producer. Alternatively, we may view (17) as the production effect of an 
increase in the mean holding constant all other moments around the mean. 
Interchanging the expectation and differentiation operators, this is admissible as 
neither lower nor upper price bound depend on the subsidy, we see from 
Hotelling's lemma that expression (17) represents the expected level of output, 
E[Q]. We are now in a position to state 
Lemma 3: Given a support on density [Dp DJ, then an upper bound on expected 
output is  ^  (D;) + EiPl f—rfP,.  
Proof: The Markov inequality for a nonnegative random variable P gives the 
inequality f,[l - F(f,)] i E[P]. Substitute this inequality into the support 
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adjusted version of equation (17). Q.E.D. 
For a given technology, represented by the profit function, no price distribution 
with the same mean can, in expectation, generate output exceeding this bound. 
We can go further by noting that the Markov inequality gives 
moments of price we can place an upper bound on expected output. If given 
knowledge on several moments we can impose a set of inequalities. 
We also note that there are couples of profit and density functions for which 
the response of expected output to a subsidy is the same. If the profit function 
V(f)/[1 " PU")}, where k is a positive constant, then E[Q] is constant. To see 
this substitute into equation (17), 
This is independent of s. The increased incentive to produce from increased, 
expected price is completely counter-balanced by the shift in the profit function. 
Note that there is a dual relationship between the profit function and the price 
distribution. The profit function dual (in this sense) to the distribution described 
by the density function f(P) solves the differential equation 
P[[l -  F(Pf)] ^ EEP'], for any r > 0. Now, if given knowledge of any of the 
changes with a change in price distribution such that n"(P) equals 
</£[ff(P+s)] 
ds 
= + /n"(P,)[l dP,-b„* k. 
0 
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(18) n(0)=i4o 
n'(0) = b^. 
For example, for the exponential price distribution F(P) = 1 - e'*'*^ we find 
-saB- = tx. 
(1 - f(a] 
and the solution is the quadratic profit function 
(19) n(f) =Xo + b^P + 0.5kXP\ 
Let us now look at the effect of a change in the technology on how 
beneficial a subsidy is. We ask whether production rises when the curvature is 
concentrated around one price level, or when it is more dispersed. To do this we 
must define a concept of curvature concentration. Denote it'^(P) by y. This may 
be viewed as the inverse of the slope of the supply curve. For convenience let 
the price p.d.f be strictly positive only on the domain [D^, Dg]. Define G = 
jn"(,P) P dP. Just as a m.p.s alters the location of density^while holding E[P] 
constant, we will alter the location of h'XP) while holding j"n'^ P) P dP 
Dt 
constant. We will call this operation a m.p.s in curvature. From a marginal cost 
curve perspective, the marginal cost curve first falls relative to it's original level, 
and then rises to above the old curve before returning to the original. As Ag 
and bo are held constant, it can be shown that a dispersion of curvature as 
described above will generate a profit function that dominates the original profit 
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function over the domain of the m.p.s in curvature, while at other points in the 
price domain the old and the new profit functions are identical. Further, the first 
derivatives of the old and new profit functions are identical at and Dj. We 
can consider this technology change as a switch from one machine to a more 
advanced one, or a change in the way inputs are combined. One might expect 
that if the profit of a firm rises at some prices and never falls, then expected 
output should rise. The following theorem shows that whether expected output 
rises or falls depends upon the shape of the price distribution. 
Theorem 3: Expected output will rise (fall) under a m.p.s in curvature according 
as F(f,) is concave (convex) in the domain of the m.p.s. 
Proof: We use Rothschild and Stiglitz concept of a mean preserving spread. 
That is, let the change in distribution function be denoted by and let 
r ( y )  = o ^ 0  for a < X < a + w 
-  a  ^  0  f o T a + v < x < a + v  +  w  
- p ^ O  f o T b < x < b + w  
P ^ 0 for b  +  e < x < b  +  e  +  w  
0 otherwise, 
where 0 < a < a  +  w i a  +  v < a + v  +  w < b i b + w < b  +  e + w ,  and 
p« = av. We may write the change in E[Q] with a m.p.s in curvature as 
a+w a+v+w 
A = «( / dP, - j àP,) 
(20) 
- p(/[l-f 'WJ dP, - / [1 dP,). 
b*e 
141 
We re-write equation (20) as the limit of a Riemann sum 
(21) 
- Urn. 
= Urn. 
-
aw 
n + 1 
Pw 
i» + l 
n + 1 
Pw 
/i + l 
Now let us invoke the mean value theorem^'. Replace 
F(a+v+iwln)-Fia+iwln) with vF'(Ç,), where F'($,) is the partial derivative 
with respect  to  price evaluated at  and where a+iwin < 5,  < a+v+iwin. 
Replace F(jb+e+iwln)-F(b+iwln) with «Fl(ii^), where 
b+iwjn < 1), < b+e+iwfn. Thus equation (21) may be rewritten as 
1 A aw Urn ds 
(22) - P w Lim. 
= a vw Lim. 
«+1 
1 
« + 1 
[ E I 
[ E "'"(5.) 1 
<-0 
n+l 
<-0 
H 
E ' - nn,) I 
1=0 
" The mean value theorem states that if *K(f,) is a continuous function on 
[aj>] and differentiable on (a,b) then, there is a point in (a,b) at which 
W(a) -  W(b) = (b -  a)W%). 
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But > b-a-v > 0. If F(Pf) is strictly concave then f> 0. 
We also know that > FXa+v)-F'(b) > 0. Let 
F'(a+v) -  F'(b) = ft, 
and substitute into equation (22), 
A i ttVwLim, ds H-*- n + l E " avwàUm^^ i-O 
n 
/i+l 
= avwfi > 0. 
ForF(Pi) convex FX'i)-F'('r\) < F'(o+v)-F'(i>) < Ô < 0 and 
A = A £[<?] < 0. 
as 
Q.E.D. 
Thus, even though the technology change is such that the altered profit function 
dominates the original profit function at some prices and is never dominated by 
the original profit function, expected output may fall. Whether it rises or falls 
depends on the curvature of the price density function in the locality of the 
change in profit function curvature. For example, if price is normally distributed 
then a curvature change that preserves G will increase expected output if all the 
curvature change occurs at prices close to E[P], but will decrease expected output 
if all the curvature change occurs at either tail of the price distribution. We can 
go further by applying Jensen's inequality to equation (17). Let the c.d.f be 
strictly concave (convex) on the domain [E^, Eg], and define 
H = jP dPllnXE2)-n'(E^)]. From theorem 3 and Jensen's inequality, if 
H is constant then expected output must exceed (cannot exceed) 
*1 
*0 + )]<«', * [l-F(H)]()t'(^)-lt'(£,)l 
0 
+ {v»(,p,ni-F(.p,n jp, .  
The technology, or profit function, that generates this lower (upper) bound on 
expected output is that constructed by extrapolating the tangent of the profit 
function at forward and extrapolating the tangent of the profit function at Eg 
backward. The intersection is at H where the profit function is kinked. Thus, 
the technology that produces the lower (upper) bound on expected output has 
zero curvature on (E^, H) and on (H, Ej). The curvature is all concentrated at H 
where it is infinite and may be represented by the limit of a Dirac delta function, 
a function used to model impulses in the theory of differential equations. 
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6, CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have shown that the existing body of knowledge on financial 
option theory can improve our understanding of the theory of the firm under 
uncertainty. The analogy would seem to possess considerable potential. We 
have applied our technique to three of the most intensively researched problems 
in the theory of the firm under price uncertainty. In the first application, the 
value of a rislqf investment, we show how a lower bound can be placed on the 
investment value. In the second application, production under uncertainty, we 
show that when the utility function has a negative second derivative, and when a 
m.p.s satisfies a condition somewhat stronger than second degree stochastic 
dominance, then output falls with the m.p.s. This condition permits multiple 
crossings of the c.d.fs. It is also shown that second degree stochastic dominance 
cannot be a sufficient condition for output to fall under a m.p.s. We prove that, 
perhaps counter-intuitively, production may rise if expected price falls and price 
becomes more dispersed. Finally, we apply the technique to the profit function 
under uncertainty. -We develop an expression for expected output and find that, 
if we hold a particular function of profit function curvature constant, then a 
spread of the profit function curvature increases (decreases) expected output if 
the price c.d.f is concave (convex) in the locality of the curvature change. While 
each problem can eventually be solved using stochastic dominance techniques, 
this approach provides insights into the economics of the problem at hand and 
into the meaning of stochastic dominance. Curvature is seen as generating 
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options on the stochastic variable. 
A particularly interesting aspect of the results presented is the way the c.d.f, 
rather than moments, are important in determining economic effects. The well-
developed statistical theory of reliability, with its emphasis on c.d.fs, may hold 
fruitful implications for the theory of the firm under uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX I 
Riemann Integration; Partition an interval [c, d] on the domain of Y into n 
segments. Thus c = ^ s Y^_^ i  Y^ = d.  A partition, X, is described 
by the points Consider the function g(Y). Define 
AF, = sup g(Y) such that Y^_^ Y û Y^. 
M, = infg(Y) such that 7^. ,  a: F ^ Y).  
f (x,  «) = A y),  MX, «) = Ê"! Ay,.  
<•1 <"1 
The U(X, g) and L(X, g) are upper and lower bounds, respectively, on the 
integration over the partition X. Define 
g) = irtf of l/(X, g) over all possible partitions = Upper 
Riemann integral. 
supj(L{X, g) = sup of L(X, g) over ail possible partitions = Lower 
Riemann integral. 
If infxU(X, g) = supxL(X, g), then the function g(Y) is Riemann integrable 
over [c, d]. 
Stieltjes Integration: Let a(Y) be a monotonically increasing function on [c, d]. 
The function may, as in the case that shall be considered, be monotonically 
decreasing also. However, to be consistent with how textbooks explain Stieltjes 
integration, we shall assume that a(Y) is monotonically increasing. Denote 
A = a(Y^) -
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U(X,g,a) = A LiX»g,a) = J] m, A a^. 
i-i <-i 
If infxU(X, g, a) = supxL(X, g, o), then the function g(.) is Stieltjes integrable 
over [c,  d] .  Now refer  to  Theorem 6.9 in Rudin [26].  
Theorem: Ifg(Y^ is monotonie on [e,  d] and if  «(YJ is both monotonie and 
eontinuous on [e, d], then g(Vj) is Stieltjes integrable. 
Now refer back to equation (7). Let g(Yj) be /(^ ~ ^|) /(f) àP, Replace 
with aj, the marginal utility at Y,. We wish to show that (7) is Stieltjes 
integrable and, at the limit, the summation sign may be replaced by an 
integration sign. We need to show that /(^ " /(f) is monotonie in Yj. 
Remember that Q is held constant. From (3) and (4) we see that 
Pi = [y, + C«?)]/<? so 
5 • 
Derive ~ /(f) ^ with respect to Y,, noting that P, is a function of Y;, 
fi 
g *" dP * 
^ = - //(P) dP -  [P^Q - C«?) - = - //(/») dP. 
Thus, the function is monotonie. We also need to show that a(Yj) = aj = 
is continuous and monotonie. If U" exists then V must be differentiable, and 
so must be continuous. If U" < 0, then «(f)) = J, = U'Çf) is monotonie. Thus, 
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at the limit we can change variables (see Rudin Theorem 6.19) and so replace 
(7) with 
£[i/(y)i = £[n + / f( r  -  r , )  f ( p ) j p  dU'. 
where is income when price is zero. Now replace dU' with U"dï^, 
^ = U" -» dU' = U" dY^. 
dYf 
By substitution we arrive at 
(8) E[UiY)] = E[y] + /  U"(Y^) f (Y-Y,)f(P)dP dY., 
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APPENDIX II 
Differentiate equation (8) above using Liebnitz rule on the variable bounds of 
integration. Note that = - C(Q), and P, =[Y| + C(Q)]/Q. 
®  *  f  -  C ' ) f { P )  d P  d Y t  
" / gp ' 
- /i"'(y,)(i',-WW[â5 SI, 
- «"(w7[P0-c«?) - ) <»%:. 
0 
The / U"(y)[yry^ term cancels. As Y„i„ = - C(Q), and 
we can write 
- U"{Y^)][PQ-Cm-Yr:^mP) dP^ 
0 "V 
= C'U"(.r^)Qfpm iP = C'V'\Y^)QEm-
0 
Therefore, the first order condition is 
(10) 0 = E [ P ]  - C ' +  f  U " ( Y ^ ) f { P  - CO /(f) dP dY^ + C'U"(Y^)QEiPl 
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APPENDIX III 
We refer to Figure 3. There are five possible situations: all the density 
changes occur above C% three of the changes occur above C^, two occur above 
it, one occurs above it, or all occur below it. Let us now consider the case where 
three changes occur above it. We will use the notation in Figure 3. Each density 
change has width 2A. 
On [?! - A, ?! + A] the value of h(P) is p. 
On [Pj - A, Pg + A] the value of h(P) is - p. 
On [P3 - A, P3 + A] the value of h(P) is - a. 
On [P4 - A, P4 + A] the value of h(P) is a. 
The m.p.s ensures that 
fh(P) dP = 0, 
O 
and 
fp h(P) dP = 0. 
0 -
When Pi > Pi, then /(^ " h(P) dP does not change. 
When Pj > P, > i*2, then 
f(P -  C') h(P) dP = f  (P-COP dP 
P, P.-A 
= 2AP(P, - CO > 0. 
When Pj > P| > P3, then 
m Pi*A 
f(P -  C') h(P) dP = f  (P-COP dP -  f (P-COP dP 
Pf P|-A 
= 2Ap(P, - Pj) > 0. 
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When P ^ >  P ^ >  P4, then 
i^+A 
-  C ' )  H P )  d P  =  -  f  (P-COa d P  =  l L a { C '  - > 0. 
f, l^-A 
When P4 > then 
m m 
J ( P  - CO A(P) d P  = J ( P - C ' ) h ( P )  d P  =  0 .  
p, 0 
Thus, in all cases the m.p.s increases the value of the function regardless of the 
value of Pj. The cases where two changes, and one change occur above marginal 
cost yield identical qualitative results. 
Now we will show that violations may occur when the entirity of the m.p.s 
occurs either above or below marginal cost. Consider when the m.p.s is all above 
marginal cost. 
When Pj > P,, then J(P - C) h ( P )  d P  does not change. 
f, 
When Pi > P, > P2, then 
f,*A 
|(P - C ' )  h ( P )  d P  = f (P-COP d P  = 2AP(P, - C) > 0. 
When ^2 ^ ^ ^3, then 
» f|+A i»2+A 
f( P  -  C) h ( P )  d P  =  f (P-COP d P  - f (P-COP d P  
Pf P|-A fg-A 
= 2Ap(P, - Pj) > 0. 
When P3 > P, > P4, then 
f^+A 
J(P - C) H P )  d P  = - f (P-COa d P  = 2Aa(C' - P4) < 0. 
p, P4-A 
When Pa^ Pi, then 
|(P - CO A(P) d P  =  f ( P - C ' ) h ( P )  d P  =  0 .  
p, 0 
Thus, if the absolute value of U" is very large when Pg > P, > and all the 
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m.p.s is above marginal cost, then the value of 
B = j  f(P-C) f(P) dP dYf may fall. This, in turn, will lead to an 
P, 
increase in output. Therefore, second degree stochastic dominance, in addition 
to risk aversion, does not ensure increased output. 
Consider when the m.p.s is all below marginal cost. 
When Pi > Pi, then f(P ~ ^P does not change. 
ft 
When P, > /*, > then 
/(/» - C) A(f) dP = j  (P-COP dP = 2AP(P, - C') < 0. 
f, P.-A 
When P2 > Pf > P3, then 
m i»,+A 
f(P -  C') hiP) dP = f  (P-COP dP -  f (P-COP dP 
P, l»,-A I'j-A 
= 2AP(P, - P2) > 0 
When P3 > Pj > P4, then 
P4*à 
f(P -  C) h(P) dP = -  f (P-C')a dP = 2Att(C' -  P^) > 0.  
P, P.-A 
When P4 > P,, then 
|(P - C') h(P) dP = f(P-C')h(P) dP = 0.  
p, 0 
From Rothschild and Stiglitz [25] theorem 1(b) it follows that 
a) any mean preserving change in the density function that can be decomposed 
into mean preserving spreads, none of which occur either entirely below marginal 
cost or entirely above marginal cost will reduce output. 
b) any mean preserving change in the density function that can be decomposed 
into mean preserving spreads all of which occur either in [0, C] or [C, «»), but 
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can not be decomposed as in a), will have a quantity effect that depends 
necessarily on the interaction between the utility curve and the c.d.f change. 
Of other mean preserving changes in the c.d.f nothing can be said at present. 
The issue involves set theory. In particular the theory of measures, signed 
measures, and measure decomposition may provide answers. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Theorem 2: For any mean reducing (increasing) spread, there exists a concave 
utility junction with U"'(X) > 0 such that production rises (falls). 
Proof: We will prove for the mean reducing case. The other case is almost 
identical. Following the analysis in Appendix III, for P, below the lowest chunk 
m  m  m m  
in h(P), /f g{P) dP < fpm àP, while fC g(P) dP - jc'm dP. Tims, 
there is a strictly positive price P" for which if P, is in [0, P ), then the value of 
j{P-C') f{P) dP falls with a mean reducing spread. Let be absolutely 
Pi 
very large, and let it rise steeply as P, rises from 0 to P*. Such a path for U"(Y) 
can be chosen so that 
B = f  U"{Yi)f{P -  C')f(P) dP dYf 
p, 
rises with a mean reducing spread. In (10), C'U"(Y^QE[P] will also rise with 
a mean reducing spread. While E[P] will fall, it is admissible to choose 
^ ~1/[QC'] so that (10) will assuredly rise. From the second order 
condition, if the right hand side of (12) is positive, then Q must rise to restore 
equilibrium. Thus Q must rise. Q.E.D. 
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GENERAL SUMMARY 
In this thesis contingent claims techniques have been applied to the problem of 
optimizing the expected value of a welfare function. In paper I we consider the 
relationship between financial market completeness, corn production, and the 
corn target price program. Using the observation that the program is similar to a 
put option issued by the government, we found that the per acre program benefit 
in 1993, at around $20/acre, was quite large. We also found that the program 
encourages producers to engage in the trading of contingent claims, and that the 
existence of contingent markets facilitates the policy maker's goal of decoupled 
agricultural support. In paper II we proposed a method for estimating the 
expected cost to the government of the corn target price program. The model 
allows the government to understand the implications for output and budget 
control of different program parameter choices This model may be adapted to 
other economic problems, such as the effects of minimum wage or rent control 
laws on production and factor use. In paper III we suggest that there is an 
inconsistency between the structure of existing contingent claims markets and 
how economists would seem to prefer to approximate demand functions. We 
propose an alternative structure that is consistent with the preferred approach to 
demand function approximation, and with the moment based foundations of 
statistics. In the final paper we propose ^n alternative perspective on problems 
involving the maximization of the expected value of a welfare function. We 
reformulate the objective function in terms of options. We then show that 
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existing techniques from economics, statistics, and finance theory may be applied 
to better understand the economic effects of uncertainty. Three standard 
economic problems are considered; valuation of a risky investment, production 
under price uncertainty, and the effects of price uncertainty on expected profit. 
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